


Consolidating Multiple Police Forces Into One

*The Feasibility of Consolidating Law
Enforcement Agencies in New Orleans*

May 1997





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
BGR also greatly appreciates the assistance and cooperation of the following agencies, authorities and entities that provided information on, and made employees available for interviews with respect to, their security departments: Facility Management of Louisiana, the Housing Authority of New Orleans, the Medical Center of Louisiana, the Municipal Building Security Division of the City of New Orleans, and the Orleans Parish School Board.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

An imposing number of governmental entities exercise law enforcement powers in New Orleans. The two largest organizations, the New Orleans Police Department ("NOPD") and the Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff's Office (the "Criminal Sheriff"), operate on a parish-wide basis. NOPD is charged with the operation of the police force and the general law enforcement function in the parish; the Criminal Sheriff's primary responsibility is the operation of the jail system. The Civil Sheriff performs limited law enforcement functions throughout Orleans. The law enforcement divisions of other governmental units, such as the Orleans Levee District, the Port of New Orleans (the "Port"), and the Crescent City Connection Division of the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (the "Crescent City Connection Division"), operate in limited areas of Orleans and, in some cases, its neighboring parishes. At least eight other governmental entities or departments maintain organizations to keep the peace on properties under their control.



In 1996 NOPD, the Criminal Sheriff and the police departments of the Port (the "Harbor Police"), the Orleans Levee District (the "Levee Board Police") and the Crescent City Connection Division (the "Bridge Police") employed more than 3,100 people and spent almost \$142,000,000. Expenditures by these groups in 1997 are expected to increase by approximately \$20,000,000, mainly as a result of the recent pay raises for NOPD officers and an increase in federal funding for local law enforcement.

Fragmentation manifests itself in some startling ways:

- ❖ Calls for assistance from call boxes on I-10 and I-610 are received by a law enforcement group that has no jurisdiction in that area.
- ❖ The City of New Orleans hires the Civil Sheriff to provide security for City Hall.
- ❖ NOPD until recently did not send a representative to meetings called by the State Police on the subject of hurricane evacuation preparations.
- ❖ Three separate 800 trunking radio systems have been built in the area by different law enforcement agencies.

PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY

The purpose of this study is twofold: (1) to assess the desirability and feasibility of combining the various police forces and departments in Orleans

Parish, and (2) depending on whether a consolidation appears desirable and feasible, to propose a plan of consolidation or lesser measures that could be implemented to achieve a more efficient and effective use of law enforcement resources in Orleans Parish. In making that assessment the study addresses the following specific questions:

1. What are the service and territorial overlaps of the various law enforcement agencies?
2. To what degree do the various law enforcement agencies now coordinate their operations?
3. How does the structure in New Orleans compare to that in other parishes and cities?
4. What would be the advantages and disadvantages, including fiscal impact, of combining police forces in New Orleans?
5. What impediments to consolidation are posed by personnel systems, funding sources, legal structures and other factors?

FOCUS OF STUDY

This study focuses on the larger state and local government entities or departments exercising law enforcement powers in New Orleans: NOPD, the Criminal Sheriff, the Levee Board Police, the Harbor Police, and the Bridge Police. In addition, it briefly reviews other city and state entities or departments that have large numbers of law enforcement or security personnel. These include the Housing Authority of New Orleans ("HANO"), the Orleans Parish School Board, the Louisiana Superdome, the City Department of Property Management, and the Medical Center of Louisiana.

The State Police are included in the study, not as a consolidation candidate on the local level, but for the part they might play in other solutions. The role of the Civil Sheriff is described; but, due to the judicial nature of its duties, the Civil Sheriff is not considered as a candidate for law enforcement consolidation.

This study does not consider the assets held or property owned by the respective law enforcement authorities, including consideration of whether all such properties are pertinent to the primary mission of the organization. This study is limited in scope to Orleans Parish. The fact that some of the entities operating in Orleans are regional in nature obviously complicates the crafting of solutions. While regional solutions might be the more appropriate response to certain jurisdictional overlaps, the evaluation of such solutions is beyond the scope of this project.

Also beyond the scope of this study is the elimination or consolidation into the government of the City of New Orleans of entire agencies or special district governing authorities for which the exercise of law enforcement powers is incidental to another mission. In those cases (e.g., Orleans Levee Board), the study is limited to the issue of whether the law enforcement component should be transferred or eliminated.

METHODOLOGY

BGR collected the information on law enforcement agencies operating in Orleans Parish through questionnaires and interviews.

Questionnaires soliciting information on authority, jurisdiction, finances, personnel, equipment/facilities and coordination with other agencies were sent to NOPD, the Criminal Sheriff, the Harbor Police, the Bridge Police, the Levee Board Police, and City Park Police. A questionnaire inquiring as to the size of law enforcement and security departments was sent to the following: Audubon Institute, the Civil Sheriff, French Market Corporation, Housing Authority of New Orleans, Louisiana Superdome, Medical Center of Louisiana, New Orleans Aviation Board, Orleans Parish School Board, Regional Transit Authority, Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans, and the Finance Director and Department of Property Management of the City of New Orleans.

After analyzing the information provided, BGR interviewed the chief law enforcement or security officer of any entity that reported more than 25 law enforcement or security personnel, as well as representatives of the State Police.

COMPARISON WITH OTHER CITIES

BGR collected from other municipalities information on the number of law enforcement agencies operating in their boundaries. It also reviewed general literature on the issue of police consolidation and a number of studies and post-merger analyses performed for other jurisdictions.

The cities contacted by BGR all indicated that a number of law enforcement agencies other than municipal police operate in their boundaries. When one considers that the City of New Orleans is also the Parish of Orleans, the number of law enforcement authorities is not out of line for a city or urbanized county of its size.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The fragmented, overlapping structure of law enforcement in Orleans Parish is certainly not what one would choose to design if given a clean slate. While a rationalization of the system through a major consolidation of the multiple law enforcement agencies has a certain theoretical appeal,

BGR does not recommend such wide-ranging action at this time for the following reasons:

- ❖ In many cases, the inefficiencies associated with overlapping jurisdictions have been mitigated in Orleans Parish by commonsense adjustments in manpower deployment. In other cases, there is little functional overlap.
- ❖ Consolidations can place major strains on the operational and managerial resources of smoothly running organizations. In the case of an organization that is recreating itself, as is NOPD, the process is likely to create more problems than it would solve, by diverting management's time and energy from the many pressing issues facing it and by introducing a new set of operational difficulties.
- ❖ Consolidation could significantly increase the cost of law enforcement, with raises in salaries and the related pension costs offsetting the economies from elimination of duplicative functions and facilities.
- ❖ While consolidation might decrease the total cost of law enforcement when the cost to the state and local government units are considered as a whole, it could actually increase the cost to New Orleans through transfer of expenses now absorbed by various authorities.
- ❖ Some of the problems associated with the fragmented system can be addressed through less drastic measures.

BGR, after considering a range of possible solutions, recommends the following structural or functional changes:

1. **consolidation of Levee Board Police into NOPD, or if NOPD is unable to absorb the Levee Board Police, transfer of its functions to NOPD**

Consolidating resources under NOPD, the agency that has primary responsibility for law enforcement throughout the City, would allow for (1) deployment of resources based on more extensive knowledge of needs and a broader perspective, (2) increased flexibility in the use of resources, and (3) increased accountability for the use of those resources. BGR does not see any compelling reason, such as specialization of services, for the maintenance of a separate police force that is funded by a citywide tax but operates in a geographically restricted area. With the exception of its limited flood control activities, the operations of the Levee Board Police involve general policing similar to that performed by NOPD.

Such a consolidation would require legislative change, entail a substantial increase in personnel costs, and present difficult funding and personnel issues arising from civil service restrictions and disparities in pension plans. Such consolidation should occur when NOPD has the financial and trained manpower resources necessary to carry out effectively the additional responsibility.

2. explicit coordination between NOPD and the Criminal Sheriff on activities of the Criminal Sheriff that go beyond the prison system and court-related duties

BGR recommends explicit coordination of general policing activities, rather than consolidation of the Criminal Sheriff and NOPD, for a number of reasons. First, because NOPD and the Criminal Sheriff perform discrete primary functions (law enforcement in the case of NOPD and prison management in the case of the Criminal Sheriff), many of the supposed benefits of consolidation are unlikely to materialize. Given the absence of major functional overlap, there is limited opportunity for streamlining expenses or redeploying police officers more effectively. Second, consolidation of the Criminal Sheriff into NOPD could create more problems than it would solve by placing major strains on NOPD's operational and managerial resources. Third, the problems associated with the one area of overlap, the limited involvement of the Criminal Sheriff in law enforcement activities outside the prison system, can be addressed by lesser means.

3. assumption by the State Police of surveillance of the interstate system in New Orleans

Throughout most of Louisiana, call boxes on the interstate system are answered by the State Police, who patrol the interstate highway system. In Orleans Parish, however, calls for service from the call boxes on I-10 and I-610 are received by the Bridge Police, a group that has no authority to respond to them, and are forwarded to NOPD.

NOPD presently patrols the interstate highway system. During the pending construction on I-10, the Causeway Police might assist with accidents and breakdowns on I-10 from the Jefferson Parish line to the Superdome.

The addition of the Causeway Police is another example of the valiant, piecemeal efforts of various governmental agencies to find solutions to immediate, pressing problems. The system needs to be rationalized, however, on a long-term basis. The State Police, charged generally with law enforce-

ment on the highways, appear to be the appropriate group to assume the duty. State Police supervision of the interstates crossing Orleans Parish would provide this parish with the same access to state resources for highway surveillance as other parishes enjoy.

4. coordination by the various agencies of their law enforcement activities and purchases

Cooperation and coordination among the law enforcement agencies are informal and based on good will. While the agencies generally agreed that they cooperate well on specific assignments, there was evidence that, except in times of special events, there is no ongoing communication between agencies to coordinate the various law enforcement activities.

Weaknesses in the existing system showed up most strikingly in the areas of communications and technology. The lack of coordination in these areas not only is costly, but also causes communication difficulties on an interagency level. Another area requiring closer scrutiny is the questionable need for three separate police training academies.

By thinking in terms of coordination and cooperation on a regular basis and by sharing information and plans, the law enforcement agencies could provide better service and save taxpayers' dollars. To that end, BGR specifically recommends that: (a) the heads of the primary law enforcement agencies or departments meet on a monthly basis to assess their needs and coordinate their activities; (b) an interagency technical committee be formed to coordinate equipment purchases and to formulate a long-term strategy for developing, to the extent possible, compatible or integrated systems; and (c) NOPD, the Criminal Sheriff, and the Harbor Police jointly investigate the feasibility of consolidating their training centers.

5. a study by the state executive branch to determine whether there should be a consolidation of law enforcement groups with interstate highway responsibilities in the greater New Orleans metropolitan area

BGR examined the possibility of consolidating the Bridge Police into NOPD. Because of the limited nature of service overlaps, the doubtful nature of economies, and, most importantly, the definite shift of cost burden from users of their services to the City of New Orleans, BGR decided against recommending such action.

BGR thinks that the more logical consolidation partner for the Bridge Police is the State Police. Both entities have traffic control as a major responsibility. The consolidation, if made in conjunction with the assumption by the State Police of responsibility for the interstate system in Orleans, would result in a seamless web for surveillance on the interstate highways. In addition, consolidation of the Bridge Police into the State Police would avoid one of the major disadvantages of an NOPD/Bridge Police consolidation: the transfer of traffic control costs to the City.

6. restraint on the part of state legislators in granting ancillary law enforcement powers to authorities and entities formed for other purposes

Much of the law enforcement fragmentation in New Orleans is traceable to the propensity of Louisiana's legislators to endow state-created authorities and other entities with law enforcement powers. BGR questions whether it is necessary for these entities to have police forces to fill their security needs. It recommends that legislators give serious consideration to other solutions, such as contracting with local law enforcement groups or hiring security guards or guard services. Some of the problems associated with the use of private police forces, particularly those related to screening and training, might be addressed by the state's setting hiring standards for agencies or prequalifying a pool of security personnel from which the various authorities could hire.

BGR recognizes that the implementation of some of the above proposals, particularly the consolidation of the Levee Board Police into NOPD, involves complicated, contentious issues that could take a number of years to resolve. Other recommendations, such as the creation of a forum for cooperation and coordination, could be implemented immediately.

INTRODUCTION

MULTIPLE POLICE FORCES IN THE AREA

In all parishes of Louisiana except Orleans, the basic police or law enforcement function is vested by the Constitution in one sheriff. Law enforcement powers are allocated differently in Orleans Parish, whose boundaries are congruent with those of the City of New Orleans. The home rule Charter of the City vests the police power exclusively in the city's police department. The Charter further provides that no other department, officer, or board operating in or for the City shall have a police force.

Despite the charter limitation, at least six other entities maintain police departments or exercise law enforcement powers in Orleans under color of various statutory or constitutional provisions. These include the Civil and Criminal Sheriffs, the State Police, the Crescent City Connection Division, the Orleans Parish Levee District, and the Port.

In addition, at least eight city departments and state authorities and commissions operate security forces with varying degrees of enforcement powers. The Orleans Parish School Board employs over 100 Security Counselors. Medical Center of Louisiana employs nearly 100 officers. HANO, the Municipal Building Security Department, and the Superdome have between 25 and 50 security officers. The City Park Commission, the Audubon Institute, and the French Market Corporation all hire smaller numbers of security officers. In some cases, the security personnel are indistinguishable from the armed security guards operating in the private arena. In other cases, the security personnel are sworn officers authorized to exercise police powers within limited areas.

Law enforcement in Orleans Parish is characterized by fragmented and overlapping territorial jurisdictions. The jurisdiction of the NOPD extends throughout all of Orleans Parish. One other entity, the Criminal Sheriff, claims broad, parish-wide law enforcement powers. The Civil Sheriff operates on a parish-wide basis for very limited purposes. Other agencies operate in discrete portions of the Parish, overlapping in jurisdiction not only with NOPD, but also in some cases with each other.

The various law enforcement groups operate under different, sometimes confusing, mandates. NOPD has a broad mandate to enforce the law and maintain the peace in Orleans Parish. Other organizations, such as the Bridge Police, the Harbor Police and the Levee Board Police, are given broad police powers in the areas under their jurisdiction. Although the grants of power are variously worded, all the primary law enforcement groups seem to interpret them as including full arrest and investigative powers.

In 1996 NOPD, the Criminal Sheriff, Harbor Police, Levee Board Police, and Bridge Police employed more than 3,100 people and spent almost \$142,000,000. Expenditures by these groups in 1997 are expected to increase by approximately \$20,000,000, mainly as a result of the recent raises for NOPD officers and an increase in federal funding for local law enforcement.

Police Forces Operating in Orleans Parish, 1997				
Police or Security Department or Force	Legal Authority	Number of Employees		FY 1997 Budgeted Expenditures
New Orleans Police Department (NOPD)	New Orleans Home Rule Charter Sections 4-501 to 503	1,350	Commissioned Officers	\$ 101,094,531
		488	Civilians	
		1,838	Total	
Criminal Sheriff	Constitution of the State of Louisiana 1974, Article V, Sect. 32	636	Deputies	\$ 50,623,700
		463	Other	
		1,099	Total	
Civil Sheriff	Constitution of the State of Louisiana 1974, Article V, Sect. 32	50	Security Officers	\$ 4,755,096
		33	Process Servers	
		50	Other	
		133	Total	
Harbor Police of the Port of New Orleans	L.R.S. 34:26	52	Commissioned Officers	\$ 3,443,097
		17	Other	
		69	Total	
Orleans Levee Board Police	L.R.S. 38:326	51	Sworn Officers	\$ 2,359,675
		25	Other	
		76	Total	
Crescent City Bridge Police	L.R.S. 48:1101.1	30	Law Enforcement Positions	\$ 961,184

WHY CONSIDER CONSOLIDATION?

The issue of police consolidation has been hotly debated for many years. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the fragmented system of law enforcement in the United States came under heavy criticism from a series of prestigious commissions. Criticism centered on the lack of standards and coordination among departments and the inability of small departments to provide a full array of police services. Proponents of consolidation argued that many of the problems could be alleviated by consolidating auxiliary services (such as crime labs, records, communications, or jails) or entire agencies.



Benefits of Consolidation

In the consolidation literature reviewed by BGR, advocates of consolidation argue that it is likely to produce the following benefits, among others:

- ❖ more equitable deployment of law enforcement personnel throughout a city or metropolitan area
- ❖ more efficient use of personnel
- ❖ economies of scale through the consolidation of operating units, reduction in overhead, and bulk purchasing

- ❖ elimination of citizen confusion over who has responsibility for providing services
- ❖ better coordination of communication, dispatch and crime-related data bases
- ❖ increased public scrutiny
- ❖ common, raised standards for hiring and training

Costs of Consolidation

Opponents of consolidation argue that big is not always better. They point to studies suggesting that small- and medium-sized departments provide a higher quality of service than do large ones. They argue that consolidation can actually decrease the responsiveness of police and increase the cost of services.

Cost increases can occur in several ways:

- ❖ Potential benefits from economies of scale can be cancelled out by pay raises extended to lower-paid law enforcement groups folded into higher-paying departments. The increases can show up in both salaries and pension costs.
- ❖ Effective, well-administered groups might sink to a less efficient operating level if melded into an organization with major operating difficulties.
- ❖ Groups that lose their individual forces might feel compelled for liability or other reasons to hire security guards or services.

THE SITUATION IN ORLEANS PARISH

The following section is based on summary descriptions of NOPD, the two sheriffs, the Harbor Police, Bridge Police, Levee Board Police, and the State Police set forth in Appendix A. Summary descriptions of the larger secondary law enforcement agencies appear in Appendix B.

JURISDICTIONAL OVERLAPS

Law enforcement in Orleans Parish is characterized by fragmented and overlapping territorial jurisdictions. Two entities, NOPD and the Criminal Sheriff, claim broad, parish-wide jurisdiction. The Civil Sheriff operates on a parish-wide basis for very limited civil purposes.

The Bridge Police, Levee Board Police, and Harbor Police operate in discrete portions of the Parish, overlapping not only with NOPD, but also in some cases with each other. In carrying out their mandate to protect Port property, the Harbor Police operate on the levee side of the Mississippi River from the Jefferson Parish/St. Charles Parish border to the St. Bernard Parish/Plaquemine Parish border, on the Inner Harbor Navigational Canal, and on the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet to Paris Road.

The jurisdiction of the Levee Board Police extends along part of the Mississippi River, along Lake Pontchartrain from the Jefferson Parish/Orleans Parish border, and inland along various canals, including the Inner Harbor, Orleans, 17th Street and London Avenue Canals. The jurisdiction of the Levee Board Police overlaps with that of the Harbor Police on the Mississippi River, the Inner Harbor Navigational Canal, and the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet.

The Bridge Police have jurisdiction on the Mississippi River Bridge, the Huey P. Long Bridge, the Chalmette/Lower Algiers, Canal/Algiers and Gretna/Jackson Avenue ferries and terminals, and the approaches to the bridges and the public ways contiguous to the bridges. Jurisdiction on the East Bank of the Mississippi River is limited by statute to the South Broad Street overpass. The ferries are located in areas within the jurisdiction of the Harbor Police and, in the case of the Gretna/Jackson Avenue and Canal/Algiers ferry terminals, the Levee Board Police.

Two of the law enforcement agencies, Harbor Police and Bridge Police, operate in multiple parishes. Harbor Police have jurisdiction in parts of Jefferson, Orleans, and St. Bernard Parishes. Bridge Police cover parts of Jefferson and St. Bernard Parishes and of the cities of New Orleans and Gretna. The Harbor Police estimate that they spend approximately 90 percent of their time in New Orleans. Most of the activity of the Bridge Police also takes place in New Orleans.

The various law enforcement groups operate under different, sometimes confusing, jurisdictional mandates. NOPD has the broad mandate to enforce state and municipal laws and ordinances and to maintain the peace in Orleans Parish. It has full police powers to carry out that mandate.

Other agencies, such as the Bridge Police, Harbor Police, and Levee Board Police, are given broad police powers in the limited areas under their jurisdiction. The Harbor Police are charged with enforcing state and municipal laws as well as the ordinances of the Port. The Harbor Police have the same power as Louisiana sheriffs to make arrests and to execute and return all criminal warrants and processes and all powers of sheriffs as peace officers.

Levee Board Police are responsible for maintaining order and exercising general police power on and off the levees and upon the surrounding waters. They have the same arrest powers as peace officers within the area under their jurisdiction. Bridge Police have, in the places under their jurisdiction, the same power to make arrests and to execute and return warrants and processes as the sheriffs of Jefferson and St. Bernard Parishes and as police officers in the cities of New Orleans and Gretna.

The potentially wasteful effects of the jurisdictional overlaps are mitigated by common-sense actions on the part of the various agencies. With minor exceptions, NOPD does not patrol areas within the jurisdiction of the Harbor Police, Levee Board Police, or Bridge Police, except to handle homicides and other deaths. Levee Board Police tend to leave the patrol of the Mississippi waterfront to the Harbor Police. Harbor Police in turn leave the patrol of the Inner Harbor Navigational Canal, except for coverage of certain bridges and patrols to prevent illegal shrimping, to the Levee Board Police. The Huey P. Long is, by agreement, covered by the Causeway Police. The Harbor Police, by agreement with NOPD, handle incidents on the Danziger and Judge Seeber Bridges.

There are cases in which the jurisdiction of NOPD does not extend as far as that of one of the other agencies. NOPD jurisdiction does not extend to the parts of other parishes or municipalities that are within the jurisdiction of the Bridge Police or the Harbor Police. Nor does it include the authority to enforce regulations of the port and levee boards.

EXISTING COORDINATION

Cooperation and coordination among the various law enforcement groups are informal and dependent on good will. As noted above, a type of coordination results, though without any concerted action or group planning, from various agencies redeploying their forces away from areas covered by other law enforcement groups. Active coordination occurs on an

ongoing basis in a limited number of cases and in connection with special events and emergency situations.

The law enforcement agencies reported only a handful of specific ongoing arrangements, few of which are committed to writing. They included (1) a letter from NOPD to the Levee Board Police setting out the scope of their authority in certain lakefront neighborhoods; (2) an agreement by the Civil Sheriff to provide security services to City Hall and five welfare offices; (3) an agreement between NOPD and HANO for NOPD to provide services to housing projects under various federal grants; (4) agreement of the Harbor Police to handle incidents on the Danziger and Judge Seeber Bridges for NOPD; (5) agreement of the Criminal Sheriff to provide services in the French Quarter; (6) agreement of the Bridge Police to receive and forward to NOPD calls for service on I-10 and I-610; and (7) availability of Bridge Police to respond to accidents in the Fourth District on NOPD request. In addition, NOPD, the Criminal Sheriff, and Levee Board Police participate in the regional Warrant Task Force.

A number of the law enforcement agencies routinely come to the assistance of NOPD for special events, such as Mardi Gras, the Sugar Bowl, and the Super Bowl. This year the State Police sent about 100 troopers for a six-day period during Mardi Gras at no cost to the City other than lodging. They also sent more than 80 troopers for the periods around the Sugar Bowl and the Super Bowl. The Criminal Sheriff and the Levee Board Police also provide services at no cost for special events. Levee Board Police allocate approximately \$40,000 of police services a year for special assistance to NOPD.

It was generally agreed that the various agencies cooperate well on specific assignments. The Criminal Sheriff and the smaller agencies all thought that the existing system worked well on a day-to-day basis. Some groups expressed a reservation, however, with the existing system's dependency on the humor of the players.

Training is one area in which there appears to be room for improved coordination and cooperation. The NOPD, Criminal Sheriff, and Harbor Police each operate training academies. In the absence of a compelling reason for maintenance of separate facilities, a unified program and common facility should be developed to serve the needs of all the law enforcement agencies in the area.

The weaknesses in the existing law enforcement system showed up most strikingly in the areas of communications and technology. The agencies indicated that in the best of all worlds, all of the law enforcement agencies would operate on the same radio system. Now, however, each of the agencies has its own radio system. With the exception of some levee board police personnel who carry NOPD radios in addition to levee board radios, none of the officers in the field can listen to dispatches from, or communicate directly with, other agencies.

Dispatchers must listen to different radios or change stations to pick up messages from other groups. Levee Board Police indicated that their dispatchers have to listen to two different NOPD stations to pick up dispatches for the two NOPD lakefront districts in which Levee Board Police operate.

The agencies more or less muddle through technologically when an emergency occurs. In the Bright Field incident, for example, the Harbor Police established a communication network at the site by providing to officers of other law enforcement agencies radios donated for the occasion by the harbor police's supplier, and by pairing up radio-equipped Harbor Police with officers from other agencies.

The continuing lack of coordination in the area of communication is costly and likely to become more so. For example, three different 800-band trunking systems have been established in the area. A common system would have both facilitated communications and saved the public money. One bright note in this area is that the Bridge Police, rather than constructing their own system from scratch, are negotiating with the Harbor Police to use theirs.

Another bright note is that NOPD under Chief Pennington has been actively soliciting assistance from other law enforcement groups. The State Police, observing that Chief Pennington is the first NOPD chief to reach out to others, cited several examples of movement toward cooperation under his leadership. These included the extension of an invitation to the State Police to assume responsibility for the interstate highway system in Orleans, and, for the first time, the attendance of NOPD at meetings called by the State Police on the subject of hurricane preparation.

THE CALL-BOX ISSUE

One of the more awkward law enforcement arrangements in Orleans Parish involves call boxes on I-10 and I-610. Calls for service from the boxes are received by the Bridge Police, a group that has no authority to respond to them, and forwarded to NOPD.

Throughout most of Louisiana the call boxes are answered by the State Police. The State Police, who patrol the interstate highway system in Jefferson and other parishes, declined to take responsibility for the call boxes in Orleans, due to lack of manpower to respond to the calls. State Police indicated that they do not normally operate in incorporated areas and, in addition, have historically been unwelcome in Orleans Parish.

The traditional stance toward the State Police has given way to a welcome mat under Chief Pennington's command. NOPD has requested the State Police to take responsibility for the interstate highway system. The State Police, in response, have indicated that they are in principle receptive to the request but are unable to oblige due to manpower shortages.

At the present time Troop B is operating at only 60 percent of its assessed manpower needs. Taking over the Orleans Parish portion of the interstate highways would require an additional 10 to 12 troopers and several years of lead time.

In the meanwhile, the pending construction on I-10 might provide Orleans Parish with a temporary solution to a part of its highway patrolling needs. The Causeway Police, acting under a three-year federal grant, have begun assisting the State Police in clearing accidents and breakdowns on I-10 in Jefferson Parish. Discussions to expand the service into New Orleans as far as the Superdome are underway. In addition, planners are considering a long-term expansion of the program throughout the metropolitan area, particularly on the I-10 twin spans and in New Orleans East.

Introducing another specialized force is an example of the valiant, piecemeal efforts of various governmental agencies to find solutions to immediate, pressing problems. The system needs to be rationalized, however, on a long-term basis. The State Police, charged generally with law enforcement on the highways, appear to be the appropriate group to assume the duty. State Police supervision of the interstates crossing Orleans would provide Orleans Parish with the same access to state resources for highway surveillance as other parishes enjoy.

THE HAPHAZARD CREATION OF POLICE FORCES

Much of the fragmentation in New Orleans is traceable to the propensity of Louisiana's legislators to endow state-created authorities and other entities with law enforcement powers. Is it necessary for these entities to have police forces to fill their security needs? Why are other solutions, such as contracting with local law enforcement groups or hiring security guards or guard services, inadequate?

The expanding world of private security forces has its own set of problems, both theoretical and practical. These problems, particularly those relating to the quality of screening and training, might make state agencies reluctant to rely on the private sector. The State could, however, control the problem by setting hiring standards for its agencies or pre-qualifying a group of security personnel from whom the various authorities could hire. Creating multiple law enforcement agencies is hardly the only solution.

EXPANDING ACTIVITIES

One of the more troubling aspects of the local law enforcement scene is the expansion by certain agencies of the scope of their law enforcement activities. Although the activities might be legally permissible, they involve matters that belong more properly in the realm of NOPD.

The Criminal Sheriff's deputies, who traditionally performed only prison management and court functions, have for some years engaged in patrols and traffic-related activities. In some cases, such as patrol for special events and in the French Quarter, these activities are conducted, not only with the knowledge of and in active cooperation with NOPD, but at their request. At other times, NOPD is not even notified of the activity.

BGR has insufficient information to quantify accurately the extent of these law enforcement activities. Sheriff Foti has indicated that such activities are performed by deputies working on an overtime or volunteer basis, not as a regular assignment.

The Levee Board Police are also engaged in general law enforcement on city streets. Such activities include patrolling the lakefront parks, providing traffic control at the lakefront, and policing lakefront neighborhoods. Recently, the Levee Board Police established a federally funded COPS program in a troubled lakefront neighborhood. Implementation of the program necessitated the hiring of an additional ten officers and the establishment of a substation.

POLICE FORCE CONSOLIDATION IN OTHER CITIES

How does the number of law enforcement authorities in New Orleans compare with that in other cities, and how have other cities dealt with a multiplicity of forces within their boundaries? What can New Orleans learn from their experience?

COMPARISON WITH OTHER CITIES

The cities contacted by BGR all indicated that a number of law enforcement agencies other than municipal police operate in their boundaries. Where city and county are coterminous, there may be a sheriff. Typically the additional law enforcement agencies in cities and city-counties are associated with special district governments or public institutions, such as airport authorities, school boards, housing authorities, transit authorities, parks, universities, stadiums, and hospitals. In addition to having these types of forces, New Orleans has three uncommon water-related police forces – the Bridge, Harbor, and Levee Board Police.

Because the City of New Orleans and Orleans Parish share the same boundaries, Orleans does not have a multitude of small municipal forces within the parish. Thus, it escapes a major fragmentation problem suffered by many parishes or counties.

When one considers that the City of New Orleans is also the Parish of Orleans, the number of law enforcement authorities is not out of line for a city or urbanized county of its size. Moreover, the amount of functional overlap is much less than the number of agencies might suggest.

CONSOLIDATION EXPERIENCE OF OTHER CITIES

The impact of police force consolidations in other jurisdictions is difficult to ascertain due to limited information and difficulty in measuring results. In addition, because of differences in context, the experiences are of limited applicability to New Orleans.

Most mergers of law enforcement agencies have involved a consolidation of municipal and county law enforcement groups, usually in connection with the general consolidation of city/county governments. Basically, the consolidations represent attempts to improve services by replacing multiple agencies operating in distinct geographic jurisdictions with a unified force covering all of the consolidated jurisdictions. As noted above, this type of fragmentation is not the type found in New Orleans.

Although the city/county mergers are of limited interest, a couple of points relating to them should be borne in mind. First, the overwhelming majority of those proposed have never been approved. Second, cost increases appear to be a common result of such consolidations. Third,

recent studies of city/county law enforcement consolidations have, for various reasons, omitted law enforcement from the consolidation recommendations or proposed lesser measures, such as consolidation of specific services.

Of more direct interest are consolidations of specialized police departments. In 1995 New York City consolidated its three major police departments, merging the Housing Police and Transit Police into the New York Police Department. Massachusetts implemented another such consolidation of special forces at the state level, by merging the Registry of Motor Vehicle Police, the Capitol Police, and the Metropolitan Police Department into the State Police.

In Boston, a task force formed to study the Boston Municipal [Buildings] Police Department (BMPD) recently recommended integration of that department and possibly the Boston Housing Authority Police into the Boston Police Department. On the West Coast, San Francisco is considering a merger of the San Francisco Airport Police into the San Francisco Police Department; and Los Angeles is evaluating the feasibility of a merger between the Los Angeles Police Department and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority of Los Angeles.

The primary goal for the merger of special-purpose forces into general law enforcement agencies appears to be the desire to improve the overall quality of service, particularly services to constituencies served by the special-purpose forces. Insufficient information is available, however, to gauge the actual effect of such mergers.

For additional information on the police force consolidation experience in other cities, see Appendix C.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

On the basis of the local situation and a review of consolidation literature, BGR considered the following scenarios:

- ❖ merger of one or more of the Criminal Sheriff, Bridge Police, Harbor Police, and Levee Board Police into NOPD
- ❖ consolidation of the Harbor, Levee Board, and Bridge Police into a special force to deal with areas involving waterways
- ❖ creation of a City Department of Public Safety to include NOPD and the Criminal Sheriff as separate units and a specialized unit to perform in Orleans the services now provided in that parish by the Harbor, Levee Board, and Bridge Police
- ❖ merger of the Bridge Police into the State Police
- ❖ providing for better coordination and communication within the existing structure

GENERAL IMPEDIMENTS TO CONSOLIDATION

Any attempt to consolidate law enforcement agencies would face a number of impediments. These include obstacles created by legal structure, personnel systems, and financial restrictions.

The power to employ police officers is granted to the Orleans Levee Board, the Port, and the Department of Transportation and Development by statute. Consolidation would require the amendment of such statutes. In the case of the Port, such amendment would require a two-thirds vote of the legislature.

One of the most difficult issues that would be encountered in consolidation is the issue of fairness to the individual employees. Any merger, public or private, that is designed to eliminate duplications and streamline organizations will negatively impact some employees by forcing them out or reassigning them to less desirable positions. The potential for unfairness is magnified in the case of mergers into NOPD, because of civil service regulations and ordinances imposing residency requirements and restrictions on job entry level and credit for prior service.

For example, under existing regulations, the highest level at which a person can transfer into NOPD is Police Officer I. No credit is given, for salary or promotion purposes, to prior service in other police forces. Thus, veteran policemen with years of experience and seniority would basically have to start over, regardless of their skills or qualifications. By way of another example, none of the parochial or state entities included in this study require that their employees live in Orleans Parish. Yet a

consolidation that resulted in the City becoming their employer would impose the city residency requirement on such employees, forcing them to uproot their families and undo major investments in order to retain their jobs.

Requirements such as these, which are onerous in the case of voluntary entry into NOPD, become draconian in the case of a forced measure. In the case of a consolidation, the impact of the civil service regulations and other city restrictions would have to be adjusted to ensure fairness to all employees, including those effectively forced into City employment through a consolidation.

Another employee-related matter that would have to be addressed is disparities in employee retirement plans. In some cases, such as the Harbor Police and the Criminal Sheriff, the retirement plans are free-standing ones. In others, such as the Levee Board Police and the Bridge Police, the departments participate in plans operated on a statewide basis. Among the problems that would need to be addressed are the terms on which transferred employees would enter a retirement system and the impact of the transfers on their former plans.

Differences in hiring and training requirements would also have to be addressed. NOPD training and testing go beyond the POST training and limited review of law enforcement personnel conducted by other agencies.

One of the most serious impediments to consolidation of police forces is funding. Transferring parochial law enforcement groups into NOPD or placing such groups under the city government would involve a transfer of assets from the various independent authorities to the City. Would such transfer involve a sale or a donation? A transfer would also place with the City responsibility for the ongoing funding of transferred groups. Unless the transfer of funding obligations were accompanied by a transfer of the funds now supporting the obligations, the cost of law enforcement to the City would increase.

In the case of the Port and the Crescent City Connection Division, it is difficult even to conceive of a basis for requiring a fund transfer to the City. An argument for such a transfer can be made in the case of the Levee Board, which receives more than half of its governmental fund revenues from taxes imposed on Orleans Parish taxpayers. One possible way of reallocating levee board funding would be through the rededication of the millage now paid to the Levee District. The issue would require further study, since it is complicated by the pledge of the millage to support various bond issues, some of which extend to 2015.

MERGERS INTO NOPD

One of the major factors affecting the desirability of consolidating any law enforcement group into NOPD is the fiscal impact of such consolidation. Determining such impact would require a detailed analysis by accountants, planners, and other financial experts beyond the scope of this study. There are, however, several general observations relevant to NOPD consolidation scenarios that can be made at this point.



1. A consolidation of law enforcement agencies that are not stand-alone entities is not likely to result in large administrative savings. The costs of accounting, payroll, and similar services would merely be transferred from one group (e.g., the Port) to another (i.e., NOPD) without major impact on the administrative costs of the continuing entities.
2. Some savings would occur in the area of support services through the elimination of dispatchers and clerical workers and the consolidation of specialty divisions, such as mounted, K-9, maritime, internal investigation, and planning. It should be noted, however, that the support units of the smaller agencies tend to be small. In addition, some of the usual targets of consolidations, such as duplicative jail systems, crime labs, and investigative units, are not present in this case. The Criminal Sheriff operates the only jail system; forensic analysis is left to NOPD.
3. Savings would most likely be offset, however, by increases in the personnel costs for transferred employees. The Bridge Police, Harbor Police, and Levee Board Police are all paid less than their NOPD counterparts. In a consolidation their salaries would have to be raised to put them on a par with their higher-paid counterparts. As municipal police, they would also become eligible for state supplemental pay. Pension costs would in most cases also increase significantly, due to increased salary bases and better benefits.

Crude calculations, based on rough estimates of changes in salary costs, fringe benefits and state supplemental pay, indicate that consolidation of law enforcement agencies into NOPD would affect personnel costs as follows:

Harbor Police	Increase of \$230,000
Levee Board Police	Increase of \$500,000
Bridge Police	Increase of \$ 9,000

4. Savings could be achieved in the future through bulk purchases of uniforms, vehicles, and other equipment, particularly in the area of communications. These savings would be offset

initially by expenses incurred in standardizing uniforms, vehicles, and equipment.

5. The elimination of police departments would not totally eliminate security costs for the authorities divested of the departments. These authorities would probably feel the same need as private enterprises to protect their properties by hiring security personnel or by contracting with private agencies for security services.
6. Even if consolidation were likely to result in savings on an over-all basis (taking into account both state and local government costs), it would increase the cost of law enforcement for New Orleans unless funds equivalent to the budgets for the various police divisions were transferred from the other authorities to the City. It is difficult to construct an argument to support the transfer in the case of the Port and the Crescent City Connection Division, which do not now receive any revenue from the City of New Orleans or its taxpayers. An argument in favor of such a transfer can be made in the case of the Levee Board, since its activities are supported in part by two ad valorem taxes paid by property owners in New Orleans. Finding a basis to force a transfer of funds is another matter, since they are pledged to various bond issues.

Merger of the Criminal Sheriff Into NOPD

- (i) The primary responsibilities of NOPD and Criminal Sheriff constitute discrete functions – law enforcement for NOPD and prison management for the Criminal Sheriff. Because of these essentially different primary functions, many of the supposed benefits of consolidation are unlikely to result. For example, the benefits commonly associated with consolidation of operating units, such as the streamlining of expenses or the ability to deploy police officers more effectively throughout an area, are unlikely to materialize. The same is true in the case of support functions and specialized units. Because many of these functions, such as crime labs and investigation, are not duplicated in New Orleans, the opportunities for effecting savings and redeploying law enforcement personnel are very limited.

There are some potential areas of savings. Cost reductions might be found in the consolidation of administrative functions, such as payroll, accounting, and personnel. Economies of scale might be achieved in limited areas (e.g., computers) through bulk purchasing. However, because much of the Criminal Sheriff's purchasing relates to items and services

specific to prisons, the scale of many purchases would remain unchanged.

A detailed, technical analysis beyond the scope of this project would have to be performed to determine the scale of these potential savings. Is such a study worthwhile? BGR is skeptical that savings on a scale sufficiently large to justify a merger would be found. The absence of overlap in line and technical-support functions eliminates the largest, most promising areas for cost-cutting and redeployment of personnel. The opportunities available for economies through elimination of overlaps are very restricted when compared to those available in other mergers of police organizations.

- (ii) Consolidations can place major strains on the operational and managerial resources of smoothly running organizations. In the case of an organization that is in the process of recreating itself, as is NOPD, merger of another large entity is likely to create more problems than it would solve. First, it would introduce a new set of management problems and pressures, such as the integration of systems and personnel and the accompanying confusion and morale problems. Second, it would divert the time and energy of NOPD's management from the many pressing issues facing it, such as recruitment, upgrade of technology, and the continuing improvement of procedures.
- (iii) Consolidation could alleviate citizen confusion as to who has responsibility and authority for services. Such confusion also could be addressed, however, through lesser measures, such as: (a) explicit coordination between NOPD and the Criminal Sheriff of any activities beyond prison management and court services, and (b) a change in nomenclature to a title that connotes prison and court management rather than general law enforcement.

BGR is cognizant of the service that the Criminal Sheriff provides to the community by stepping forward to provide supplemental law enforcement services. Restricting powers of the Criminal Sheriff as suggested above would not prevent the Criminal Sheriff from going the extra mile as a good citizen. Rather, it would create a framework for more effectively utilizing those services through coordination with NOPD.

BGR recommends taking the lesser measure of coordination of authority rather than full-scale consolidation of NOPD and the Criminal Sheriff.

Consolidation of Harbor Police into NOPD

- (i) There do not appear to be any clear-cut advantages to consolidating NOPD and the Harbor Police. Although consolidation offers at first glance the advantage of adding to NOPD an additional fifty policemen for deployment as needed throughout the city, the possibility is illusory. In reality, far fewer officers would be available for reassignment. Effective redeployment of excess manpower to other areas has already occurred by virtue of NOPD's and the Levee Board Police's having left the policing of the port area to the Harbor Police.
- (ii) Consolidation would not remedy inequities in resource allocation. The existing correlation between the funding source for the department and the recipients of the police services appears to be fairly direct. Users of the Port pay for the department; members of the port community benefit from the services that it provides.
- (iii) One area of potential cost savings in a consolidation would be the elimination of the two stations used by the Harbor Police. NOPD has indicated that, unless a consolidation involved 100 or more employees, it would transfer acquired employees to the existing district offices. BGR does not have enough information to calculate the amount of the savings from the station closings.

There is not potential for a large reduction in administrative costs, since the administrative structure of the Port would remain in effect regardless of the disposition of the police division. Costs associated with the harbor police's one specialized unit (consisting of a boat and its crew) would have to remain, since NOPD has no boating capability. (Such costs might be eliminated if both Harbor and Levee Board Police were transferred, since both have maritime equipment.) Areas such as equipment purchases offer some potential savings, but the amount is not known.

Consolidation of the Harbor Police into NOPD would actually increase police personnel costs. Because NOPD personnel are paid substantially more than Harbor Police and receive state supplemental pay, the aggregate increases of personnel costs in a consolidation are likely to exceed savings from the elimination of positions. As noted above, rough estimates indicate that cost increases from transferring to NOPD employees below the rank of lieutenant could be around \$230,000.

- (iv) Whether the savings from closing facilities and economies of scale would be enough to offset increased personnel costs is unknown at this time. What is known is that the consolidation would shift to New Orleans taxpayers costs now absorbed by the Port. City funds would have to be found to support Harbor Police personnel consolidated into NOPD. City funds would have to be found for the purchase and maintenance of transferred equipment.

In effect, the residents of New Orleans are receiving an incidental benefit from the presence of the Harbor Police. Why forego the benefit unless there are compelling reasons to reorganize?

Consolidation of Bridge Police into NOPD

The analysis with respect to consolidation of the Bridge Police into NOPD is in most respects similar to that of the Harbor Police.

- (i) There is limited opportunity for more efficient deployment of personnel through the elimination of overlaps in duties. The on-paper overlaps in jurisdiction with NOPD have not translated into a duplication of manpower, since NOPD does not service the Bridge or the ferries and ferry landings, except to handle homicides and vehicular accidents.

There do appear to be some patrol overlaps with respect to the ferry landings on the Mississippi River. The extent of these overlaps is insufficient to suggest a remedy as drastic as consolidation. They are sufficient, however, to prompt inquiry as to whether the resources of the Bridge Police could be better utilized if responsibilities for the scattered ferry sites were reallocated to law enforcement groups otherwise operating in the vicinity, such as Harbor Police or the primary law enforcement agencies in the three parishes. Possible consideration of reallocation of resources is particularly pertinent in the case of the Chalmette Ferry, which is separated by miles from the Bridge and the other ferries.

- (ii) There appears to be a fairly direct correlation between funding sources for the Bridge Police and beneficiaries of their services. The funding comes mainly from bridge and ferry tolls and in part from Highway Fund No. 2. The law enforcement services benefit users of the Bridge.
- (iii) Whether the consolidation of Bridge Police would result in over-all saving is uncertain. There does not appear to be an opportunity for reduction in administrative costs. Possible savings from the elimination of facilities and economies of

scale in purchasing are unknown. The impact on personnel costs is difficult to predict. Rough calculations based on the number and rank of existing employees indicate a slight increase in personnel costs. Bridge Police are, however, actively seeking a substantial number of recruits and have recently obtained large salary increases for the lower ranks to facilitate their hiring efforts. A modest increase in the number of Bridge Police would greatly enlarge the increase in personnel costs.

- (iv) Consolidation would shift costs from the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development to the City of New Orleans.
- (v) One clear advantage would be the reduction of citizen confusion as to law enforcement responsibilities. At the present time a small bridge police force is operating in noncontiguous portions of two parishes and two cities. Can the man on the street – driving down the Pontchartrain Expressway to be exact – know that NOPD should be contacted for problems on the lake side of the South Broad Street overpass but the Bridge Police should be called for everything other than fatalities on the river side of the overpass? We think not.
- (vi) A disadvantage cited by the Bridge Police is that traffic flow over the Bridge would be seriously impaired by the inability of NOPD to provide the same timely response to traffic incidents as is now provided by the Bridge Police.

In view of the limited nature of service overlaps, the doubtful nature of economies, and the definite shift of cost burden to the City, BGR does not recommend a consolidation of the Bridge Police into NOPD. BGR believes that the more logical consolidation partner for the Bridge Police would be the State Police. For the reasons set forth in the section below on the merger of these two agencies, BGR recommends that the state executive branch seriously investigate a consolidation into the State Police of the Bridge Police and other regional entities dealing with parts of the state and interstate highway system in the metropolitan area.

Consolidation of Levee Board Police into NOPD

- (i) Service overlaps in the area within the statutory jurisdiction of the Levee Board Police have been largely eliminated. The Levee Board Police do not on a regular basis patrol the Mississippi River area covered by the Harbor Police; the Harbor Police, in turn, generally leave the patrol of the Inner

Harbor Navigational Canal to the Levee Board Police. NOPD does not police the levees, the Lakefront Airport, the lakefront parks, or streets and roads on the lake side of Robert E. Lee Boulevard. Thus, there is limited opportunity in that particular area for elimination of duplication of service.

The same is not true, however, for the areas into which the Levee Board Police have expanded pursuant to special authorization from NOPD. In those areas, both Levee Board Police and NOPD are independently operating in the same territory, with the Levee Board Police authorized to handle completely only the less serious incidents.

- (ii) The Levee Board Police are supported (with the exception of a federal COPS grant) from the general funds of the Levee Board, which receives more than half its Governmental Funds from taxes levied throughout New Orleans and from related state revenue sharing funds. The Levee Board received \$14,804,796 from ad valorem taxes and an additional \$1,583,544 from related state revenue sharing funds in fiscal 1996. Governmental Fund revenues amounted to \$28,206,298 according to the "Memorandum Only" totals in the 1996 financial statements. Revenues of the Proprietary /Enterprise Funds, including casino revenues, totaled an additional \$11,598,685.

Activities of the Levee Board Police include patrolling the levees, securing the two marinas and the Lakefront Airport owned by the Levee Board, and patrolling and providing traffic control for the lakefront recreational areas owned and developed by the Levee Board. Levee Board Police also patrol lakefront neighborhoods and respond to calls for service in them. In addition, they operate a COPS program in the Little Woods neighborhood. Levee Board Police have indicated that, through scheduling adjustments, they are able at peak times to have 30 cars on the lakefront. During normal times, they have about ten.

The operations of the Levee Board Police are restricted by state law and by agreement with NOPD to a limited portion of New Orleans. Yet citizens citywide are paying for the force. Is the maintenance of a separate force for the functions served by the Levee Board Police warranted? The answer to that question depends in part on whether the functions performed by the Levee Board Police are so specialized or vital that they are best performed by a dedicated force.

Clearly the maintenance and protection of the levee system, the primary purpose of the citywide special district, is of vital concern to the entire city. Levee Board Police appear to spend, however, a relatively small portion of their time on activities related to that function. They estimate that approximately 50 percent of their workload relates to the activities and properties of the Levee Board, which include levees, marinas, airports, and lakefront parks. Levee protection is only one of the four areas that fall into this 50 percent.

With the exception of levee protection, the activities performed by the Levee Board Police appear to be similar in nature to those performed by NOPD. If the activities performed by the Levee Board Police are not specialized to levees, there is little justification for the existence of a special force – even if it is authorized by law.

Many of the activities of the Levee Board Police involve general neighborhood policing. The expansion of a special purpose police department into general neighborhood policing raises some troubling issues. Such expansion can create serious issues of accountability by allowing a police force that is not under the direct supervision of the municipal government, and whose loyalties and primary responsibilities lie elsewhere, to provide a fundamental municipal government service.

Consolidating the Levee Board Police into NOPD, the agency that already has primary responsibility for law enforcement throughout the City, would allow for: (1) deployment of resources based on more extensive knowledge of needs and a broader perspective, (2) increased flexibility in the use of limited resources, and (3) increased accountability for the use of those resources. The broader perspective, greater flexibility, and improved accountability should contribute to better coordinated, more effective policing.

- (iii) Consolidation of the Levee Board Police into NOPD is likely to increase personnel costs of policing substantially. Rough calculations indicate that the increase could exceed \$500,000. Whether these increases could be offset by savings from closure of stations, elimination of administrative costs, and other economies of scale is unclear but unlikely. Savings from administrative costs are unlikely to materialize since levee district administrative departments would remain in place with the Levee Board even after a transfer of police employees. A determination of savings from the elimination of stations and in purchasing, along with the offsetting costs

from standardizing equipment, would require a more detailed economic analysis.

- (iv) Consolidation of the Levee Board Police into NOPD, unlike that of the Harbor Police into NOPD, would not result in a shift of expenses from users of services to taxpayers in Orleans Parish. The taxpayers are already paying for both the Levee Board Police and the NOPD, albeit through different tax levies. The challenge would be reallocating to the primary law enforcement agency the monies now used to support the special district police.
- (v) Consolidation should, of course, be effected in a manner and on a timetable that does not create unnecessary voids in the police protection currently provided by Levee Board Police. Consolidation also should not precipitously transfer to NOPD obligations it is unable to handle. To expand the territorial scope of NOPD's actual responsibilities at a time when that department is still understaffed and undertrained would place an additional burden on a department still lacking in capacity. The Report of the Police Compensation Commission published in September 1995 concluded that, even if increased compensation resulted in 100 new recruits each year, a "highly unlikely" prospect, NOPD would still, at the end of five years, be facing close to 200 vacancies.
- (vi) As noted below in the section on impediments, a number of obstacles would have to be overcome in order to effect a consolidation of the Levee Board Police into NOPD, not the least of which would be legislative changes regarding authority and funding. Additional complications, such as the personnel system adjustments that would arise from civil service restrictions and pension plans, would add to the lead time required for a consolidation.

CREATION OF A SPECIAL WATERWAYS FORCE

- (i) Among the options considered in the course of this study was the consolidation of the Harbor, Levee Board and Bridge Police into a special waterways force. The Bridge Police was originally included in the option because of its responsibilities for the ferries and ferry landings. In the course of the review, it became clear that the water-related duties of the Bridge Police played a secondary role to highway traffic control. BGR concluded that folding the Bridge Police into the State Police would be a more promising consolidation scenario than including it in a waterways force. BGR has therefore eliminated the Bridge Police from discussion of the special waterways force, except to recommend the transfer of responsibility for

the ferries and ferry landings to any such group. The ferry landings are scattered through the area now patrolled by the Harbor Police and could be included in their patrol, thus allowing for more efficient use of police resources.

- (ii) How would one create a special waterways force? One idea would be to withdraw the legislative powers of the Levee Board and the Port to operate their own police forces and, as an alternative, authorize them to operate one jointly. The proposal raises many questions that would have to be resolved: How much would each group contribute? To whom would the new force report? How would conflicts as to its operation be resolved? Are there any advantages to this arrangement other than the reduction by one of the number of law enforcement groups operating in the area?
- (iii) The consolidation of the Levee Board Police and the Harbor Police is not likely to free up officers for redeployment, since Harbor Police and Levee Board Police seem to have adjusted their troop assignments to take into account coverage provided by the other force. Consolidation would, however, add a degree of order by providing a common command structure to oversee the utilization of resources, thus allowing adjustments as needed for emergency and other situations.
- (iv) One disadvantage would be loss of accountability, at least at the local level. The Harbor Police and the Levee Board Police currently answer to their respective local authorities. The combined force, with two masters, could end up answering to no one.
- (v) As in the case of the NOPD consolidations considered above, definitively establishing the fiscal impact of a harbor police/levee board police consolidation would require an in-depth analysis by financial and other experts. The following general observations can be made at this time:
 - (a) Since consolidation would involve the formation of a new entity out of divisions of other entities, consolidation would require the creation of a new administrative structure without significantly impacting the overhead costs of the other entities. The cost is not known at this time.
 - (b) Since the new entity would require a command structure and some support services (such as dispatch, communications, and internal investigations), the opportunities for elimination of duplicative positions would not be as great as in a merger of several entities into NOPD. Savings from elimination of command structure are estimated at \$330,000 (salary adjusted by a blended benefit ratio of 28 percent). Elimination of

duplicate dispatch would result in savings of roughly \$90,000.

- (c) Additional savings might be found through the elimination of duplicate boating units. The annual budget for the levee board police's boating unit is approximately \$140,000.
- (d) It is unlikely that the cost savings attributable to elimination of duplicate command and support units would be cancelled out by large per-officer salary increases. Salaries for sworn personnel would increase by far less than in an NOPD consolidation, since the salary differential between Harbor Police and Levee Board Police is smaller than the differential between those two agencies and NOPD. When the salary costs of retained personnel are offset against savings from terminations of ranking officers and dispatch, overall salary costs for sworn personnel decrease by approximately \$220,000. See the rough salary calculations set forth in Appendix E. When an additional adjustment for related benefits is made, over-all personnel costs for sworn personnel decrease by approximately \$280,000.
- (vi) A factor which might make this proposal more appealing from a financial point of view is that the costs of the protection for the Port would not be shifted to the New Orleans. As noted above, New Orleans taxpayers are already paying for the Levee Board Police through the taxes paid into the levee board's general fund.
- (vii) Some of the problems identified in the case of the Levee Board Police, specifically the limitation of the role of the force, would need to be addressed. It is possible that the separation of the force from the Levee Board would be enough in and of itself to cause the Levee Board to reassess its policing requirements.
- (viii) BGR's earlier proposal to consolidate the Levee Board into NOPD or transfer its functions to NOPD is incompatible with the proposal to form a waterways police. BGR prefers the NOPD option because the waterways solution is basically a half-way measure. After all the turmoil associated with reorganization, a separate police force would remain in operation, a new administrative structure would have been created, and problems associated with the levee board's expenditure of taxpayers funds for municipal policing in a limited area of the city would not necessarily have been corrected. BGR would recommend further pursuit of a waterways police force only if NOPD cannot absorb the Levee Board Police or its functions.

CREATION OF A CITY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

The creation of a city Department of Public Safety in theory would provide a mechanism for overseeing and compelling coordination among the various law enforcement groups. Such a department could oversee the development of technological systems to maximize integration and purchasing economies. It could compel the deployment of forces, when needed, regardless of the mood and goodwill of any individual.

The creation of a Department of Public Safety would require at least three major structural changes: (a) the creation of a new layer of municipal bureaucracy; (b) the re-designation of the office of Criminal Sheriff from an elected parochial one to an appointed municipal one; and (c) the removal of the Harbor, Levee Board and Bridge Police from the control of state authorities to municipal government.

The creation of a Department of Public Safety would have one obvious disadvantage: the introduction of another layer of management and its attendant costs. Whether the department would be able to command off-setting economies through coordination and oversight of the budget processes would be largely dependent on management skills and is unknown at this time.

BGR's conclusion with respect to transferring the Harbor, Levee Board and Bridge Police is the same as was set forth in the previous sections. The consolidation of the Harbor Police would create financial problems without solving other major problems. The Bridge Police would appear to be more appropriately consolidated into the state system, and the Levee Board Police should be consolidated into NOPD to provide for greater flexibility in the deployment of police throughout the area.

One qualifier needs to be added to the conclusion with respect to the Levee Board. It might be advantageous to maintain that department as a separate entity, if the salaries for personnel in a separate entity did not have to be raised to the level of NOPD. Whether equalization of salaries would be required would depend on whether the duties of that group were sufficiently distinguishable from those of NOPD personnel to justify a different job classification, a matter that would require further exploration. On the face of it, however, creating a separate department based on distinguishable duties would appear to result in the creation of an extremely small unit.

If the smaller police forces were treated as suggested above, the only major reorganization of existing entities would involve the insertion of the Criminal Sheriff into the municipal framework. Should the Criminal Sheriff be redesignated as a municipal department?

We have identified only one potential benefit from the transfer of the office: the possibility of greater day-to-day accountability of the Criminal

Sheriff as a result of the checks and controls of the management structure of the City of New Orleans. This possibility is a rather vague, unquantifiable benefit, insufficient by itself to provide a basis for recommending a change.

Support for this proposed solution is further weakened when one considers the hostility and lack of cooperation that would accompany its implementation. In addition, although it is difficult at this point to make even rough calculations as to the financial impact of the transfer, it seems probable that personnel costs would increase. Benefits alone would cause a rise, since the Criminal Sheriff's benefit-to-salary ratio of approximately 10 percent is the lowest encountered in this study. Whether additional increases would be required by the Civil Service Commission because of perceived similarities to other municipal jobs is unknown at this time. Transition costs from integration of the office into the city's managerial structure are also unknown.

CONSOLIDATION OF BRIDGE POLICE INTO STATE POLICE

This study previously noted a number of advantages and disadvantages associated with the consolidation of the Bridge Police into NOPD. In BGR's view, one disadvantage, the shifting of costs of law enforcement from the users of the Bridge to the municipality, outweighed the advantages that might flow from such a consolidation.

The cost-shifting would not be an issue, however, if the powers and responsibilities of the Bridge Police relating to the Bridge were transferred to the State Police. The transfer, if made in conjunction with an assumption by the State Police of responsibilities for the interstate and state highways, would also eliminate confusion as to who has responsibility for what on the interstate highway system by placing all policing responsibility clearly with the single entity that is charged with enforcement on the highway system as a whole. In the case of such a transfer, surveillance of the highway system would become a seamless web.

Bridge Police, when questioned about potential negative impact of consolidation into NOPD, cited an increase in traffic flow problems on bridge approaches. They indicated that minutes in response time had a major impact on the size of the traffic problem and expressed fear that NOPD, with its broad focus and many issues, would not respond in a timely fashion. The risk should not be as great in the case of the State Police, which do focus on traffic issues.

The Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections and the Department of Transportation and Development are actively discussing the consolidation of the Bridge Police into the State Police. BGR commends them for undertaking the evaluation and recommends that the state

executive branch consider whether other traffic-related police forces, such as the Causeway Police, should be folded into the State Police.

COORDINATION

Some of the problems arising out of fragmentation of police forces in New Orleans can be solved with a change of attitude rather than of structure. By thinking in terms of coordination and cooperation and by sharing information and plans, the law enforcement agencies could provide better service and save taxpayers many dollars, particularly in the area of infrastructure investments.

In order to encourage coordination and cooperation, BGR specifically recommends that: (a) the heads of the primary law enforcement agencies or departments meet on a monthly basis to assess their needs and coordinate their activities; (b) an inter-agency technical committee be formed to coordinate equipment purchases and to formulate a long-term strategy for developing, to the extent possible, compatible or integrated systems; and (c) NOPD, the Criminal Sheriff, and the Harbor Police jointly investigate the feasibility of consolidating their training centers.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following is a summary of the structural or other changes recommended by BGR :

1. consolidation of the Levee Board Police into NOPD or, if NOPD is unable to absorb the Levee Board Police, transfer of its functions to NOPD. Such consolidation or transfer should be subject to, and timed to coincide with, NOPD's having adequate manpower and management capacity to assume the transferred duties
2. explicit coordination between NOPD and the Criminal Sheriff on activities of the Criminal Sheriff that go beyond the prison system and court-related duties
3. assumption by the State Police of the surveillance of the interstate highway system in New Orleans
4. coordination by the various agencies of their law enforcement activities and purchases. To that end, BGR specifically recommends that: (a) the heads of the primary law enforcement agencies or departments meet on a monthly basis to assess their needs and coordinate their activities; (b) an inter-agency technical committee be formed to coordinate equipment purchases and to formulate a long-term strategy for developing, to the extent possible, compatible or integrated systems; and (c) NOPD, the Criminal Sheriff, and the Harbor Police jointly investigate the feasibility of consolidating their training academies
5. a study by the state executive branch to determine whether there should be a consolidation of law enforcement groups with interstate highway responsibilities in the greater New Orleans metropolitan area
6. restraint on the part of state legislators in granting ancillary law enforcement powers to authorities and entities formed for other purposes

BGR recognizes that the implementation of some of these recommendations, particularly the consolidation of the Levee Board Police into NOPD, involves complicated, contentious issues that could take a number of years to resolve. Other recommendations, such as the creation of a forum for cooperation and coordination, could be implemented immediately.

Among the difficulties that would have to be addressed in the context of a Levee Board Police/NOPD consolidation are funding issues and

personnel problems arising from civil service restrictions and disparities in pension plans. Implementation of the consolidation recommendation would require legislative action.

APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTION OF PRIMARY AGENCIES

NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT

NOPD, a part of the Executive Branch of the City of New Orleans, is the primary law enforcement agency in the City of New Orleans. Its jurisdiction includes all of Orleans Parish.

NOPD is charged with the enforcement of all state and municipal laws and ordinances and with the maintenance of peace and protection of property. The City Charter provides that the NOPD shall, among other things, "make all legal searches, seizures and arrests and exercise all legal authority incident thereto which is now or may hereafter be conferred by law upon police officers..." The Charter further provides that no other department, officer, or board operating in or for the City shall have a police force. The provision is difficult to reconcile with state constitutional provisions authorizing other political entities in Orleans to operate police forces.

As of October 28, 1996, the NOPD had 1,838 employees, of which 1,350 were commissioned and 488 were civilians. There were 386 vacancies in the department. One thousand three hundred seventy-two people were employed by the Operations Bureau. Seven hundred three of these were employed in the eight District Offices.

NOPD officers must be 20 years of age, have a high school diploma or GED, pass civil service and psychological tests, and complete the training program at the police academy. The NOPD is severely understaffed and has undertaken extensive recruiting efforts to hire 200 to 300 new recruits in 1997. More than 300 officers become eligible for retirement in that year.

NOPD's budgeted expenditures for 1996 and 1997 equaled \$84,944,339 and \$101,094,531. NOPD budgeted \$77,492,615 and \$94,332,961 for personal services in 1996 and 1997, respectively.

NOPD commissioned officers participate in the Municipal Police Employee Retirement Plan. Payments to that system equaled \$14,686,000 in 1996 and are budgeted at \$13,403,000 for 1997. The ratio of benefits (including those for retirees) to salary (including millage and overtime, but excluding state supplemental pay) was approximately 53 percent in 1995 (\$27,496,000 in benefit costs to \$52,072,000 in salary costs).

NOPD officers' starting salaries that went into effect as of February 9 are shown in the accompanying chart.

NOPD is funded largely through the city's General Fund. Additional funding of approximately \$9,775,000 is received from grants. HANO provides \$4,630,000 for programs in the housing developments; \$4,267,455 is received from the Department of Justice for the COPS program citywide; and approximately \$7,000,000 is expected from the increase in the franchise tax for Entergy.

NOPD operates on an 800 trunking radio system. The only other law enforcement groups with radios for the system are the Levee Board Police and the Municipal Building Security Department. The system does not interface with the other 800 radio systems in the area. Communications take place by telephone calls between dispatchers or over the mutual aid station.

The district offices are not now connected to headquarters, and there is no mobile data system. The mainframe, an IBM ES/9000, is connected largely to



Recruit	\$22,500
Police Officer I	25,164
Police Officer II	26,448
Police Officer III	27,804
Police Officer IV	29,220
Sergeant	33,492
Lieutenant	37,464
Captain	45,156
Major	50,496
Assistant Superintendent	60,096

*Note: Figures do not include uniform allowance, state supplemental pay, or longevity pay.
Source: Times Picayune, January 10, 1997, at p. A-6*

personal computers and interfaces with NCIC, MOTIONS, and the Louisiana Law Enforcement Communications System.

NOPD receives donated assistance for special events from other law enforcement agencies, including the Criminal Sheriff, the State Police, and the Levee Board Police. In addition, NOPD from time to time receives assistance in the French Quarter from other entities. The Criminal Sheriff has been helping in the patrol of that area since August 1996. The Bridge Police assist the Fourth District by responding to calls involving traffic accidents. NOPD has a written agreement with the Levee Board Police allowing them to patrol and respond to calls in certain lakefront neighborhoods.

NOPD handles homicides and special investigations for other law enforcement agencies operating in New Orleans and trains personnel from other agencies at its police academy. In addition, it provides police service to HANO under the COPS (Community Oriented Policing Squad) program.



CRIMINAL SHERIFF

The Criminal Sheriff has responsibility for the detention facilities of Orleans Parish. The Criminal Sheriff operates 14 facilities and houses, feeds, cares for and controls local, state, and federal prisoners sentenced to these facilities or awaiting transfer to other prisons.

In addition, the Criminal Sheriff is the executive officer of the Criminal District Court and has the authority to serve citations, summonses, and other court papers and to execute writs, mandates, orders, and judgments directed to him by the Criminal District Court. He also serves ex officio as the chief executive officer of the Law Enforcement District of Orleans Parish. The District, which is coterminous with the City of New Orleans, was established to allow the levy and collection of taxes for the operation, improvement, and construction of jail facilities in Orleans Parish.

The Criminal Sheriff has assumed from the City certain responsibilities not required by law. These include operation of the House of Detention, the central lock-up, and the curfew center. He also provides housing for some juvenile offenders.

The extent of the criminal sheriff's law enforcement powers has been a subject of dispute. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that, although the Criminal Sheriff is not the chief law enforcement officer of Orleans, he has a duty to keep the peace and to apprehend public offenders. The duty infers significant law enforcement powers, including the power to conduct criminal investigations and to make arrests. The power of arrest is not limited to misdemeanors committed in his presence.

According to the Criminal Sheriff, all of his employees are assigned to prison-related or court duties. Law enforcement activities, such as patrols in the French Quarter, are staffed on an overtime or volunteer basis.

In the fall of 1996, the Criminal Sheriff had 1,284 authorized positions, of which 1,099 were filled. Seven hundred fifty-six of the authorized positions were for deputies; 636 of these positions were filled. The Criminal Sheriff also had 82 reserve deputies who volunteer at least 24 hours of service a month.

Salary ranges and averages for positions in the Deputy Pay Plan are shown in the accompanying chart.

Total payroll expenditures in 1996 equaled \$23,977,708. Gross salaries and fringe benefits amounted to \$21,724,482 and \$2,253,226, respectively. Personal services were budgeted at \$25,907,224 in 1997, with \$23,020,040 anticipated for salaries and \$2,387,178 for fringe benefits. The criminal sheriff's fringe benefit costs, particularly pension expenses, are extremely low compared to those of other agencies included in this study. The

Criminal Sheriff operates a defined contribution plan to which the employer and employees are each required to contribute 9 percent of base salary. Significant amounts are credited against the employers contributions each year because of forfeitures.

Expenditures for the criminal sheriff's office were \$50,560,254 in 1996 and are budgeted at \$50,623,700 for 1997. Most of the criminal sheriff's revenue is derived from per diem charges for the housing of federal, state, and municipal prisoners. In 1996 the Sheriff received \$46,377,260 of revenue from the following sources: \$22,529,642 from the City, \$18,429,258 from the Department of Corrections, and \$5,418,360 from the Federal Government. The 1997 budget estimates approximately the same amounts from these sources.

The criminal sheriff's facilities are all connected by a fully integrated computer system capable of transmitting, receiving, and sharing information with all other criminal sheriff's office locations. In addition, the Criminal Sheriff maintains linkages with numerous external law enforcement, judicial, and corrections agencies.

The agencies in the criminal sheriff's computer network include: New Orleans District Attorney's Office; NOPD; New Orleans Youth Center, Harris Telephone System; New Orleans Office of Indigent Defense; Louisiana Department of Corrections; Louisiana Probation and Parole; the State Police; Criminal District Court Collections Office; New Orleans Municipal Court; Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals; Louisiana Supreme Court; Clerks of Court; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; and United States Probation and Parole.

The Criminal Sheriff is able to access, among other data bases, the NOPD's MOTION system, the Department of Corrections' CAJUN system, Louisiana's computerized criminal history, data from the Department of Motor Vehicles, and the State Police's Automated Fingerprint Identification System. The criminal sheriff is working on expanding its computer linkages beyond the boundaries of Orleans Parish.

The Criminal Sheriff expects to have a video arraignment system in operation soon. The initial phase of the project will link local courts to remote courtroom sites located in selected criminal sheriff's facilities. The Criminal Sheriff anticipates expanding the system to include all of the approximately 76 inmate housing areas for programs such as telemedicine, televisitation, and other teleconferencing functions. This system is expected to cut drastically the amount of time, manpower, and security risks now involved in inmate transfers to courts or clinics.

The Criminal Sheriff extensively cooperates and shares resources with other agencies. The criminal sheriff's training academy is used by other agencies, including other sheriffs, Levee Board Police for Orleans and East Jefferson, Medical Center of Louisiana police, the Slidell Police Department, and Plaquemines Parish juvenile deputies. In addition, the Criminal Sheriff avails itself of the facilities of other agencies in the training of its personnel. K-9 and mounted patrol are trained by NOPD. Other training is provided by the New Orleans Fire Department, the Department of Commerce, and Northwestern Institute.

The Criminal Sheriff participates in a number of multi-agency task forces, including the Violent Crime Task Force, the Warrant Task Force, and the Marshall Service Strike Team. It operates the Drug Use Forecasting Program in New Orleans for the National Institute of Justice.

Criminal Sheriff Salary Ranges and Averages in the Deputy Plan			
	Range		Average
Court Deputy	\$11,192	\$12,311	\$11,752
About Face	14,997	16,469	15,733
Recruits	14,997	16,752	15,875
Deputy	19,330	23,992	21,661
Corporal	23,616	25,968	24,792
Sergeant	24,579	28,488	26,534
Lieutenant	27,614	32,148	29,881
Captain	31,397	36,696	34,047
Major	38,175	41,992	40,084

Note: Averages were computed by taking the average of the highest and lowest salary levels for the positions indicated.

The Criminal Sheriff has since August 1996 assisted NOPD in patrolling the French Quarter. The Criminal Sheriff also helps the City and other law enforcement agencies in rescue and relief operations during natural disasters.

The Criminal Sheriff operates the DARE program in elementary schools and assists the Orleans Parish School Board in the operation of the Truancy Center. It assists law enforcement agents in other jurisdictions in searching for escapees, acting as undercover agents in those parishes, and providing courtesy holds of prisoners in transit. It shares jail space, when available, with other parishes and the federal government.

CIVIL SHERIFF


The Civil Sheriff is the chief executive officer of the Civil District Courts of Orleans Parish. He and his deputies serve citations, summonses, subpoenas, and other processes; execute writs for judicial sales; and carry out other court orders. The Civil Sheriff provides security for the Civil District Courts, the Courts of Appeal, and the Supreme Court. By contract with the City, he also provides security service to five welfare offices and to City Hall.

The security services provided by the Civil Sheriff have grown dramatically in recent years. In 1983 security consisted of one person on duty at night. Approximately 50 people are now employed in providing around-the-clock security services. Five people provide security to the welfare offices. Twenty-three are assigned to the city's Department of Property Management to provide security to City Hall and other municipal facilities. The rest are assigned to the courts.

The Civil Sheriff employs 133 people. As noted above, approximately 50 of them provide security service. Approximately another 33 act as process servers. The remainder are employed in the Docket, Litigation, and Seizure Departments or in administration.

Deputies are armed and have parish-wide civil jurisdiction. They have authority to arrest people for failure to comply with civil court orders and for illegal activities to which they are a witness. They do not have investigative powers. Persons arrested for violations of civil court orders are delivered to the court. In the rare cases in which a person is arrested as a result of criminal activities, the arrestee is turned over to the Criminal Sheriff.

Expenditures for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1996 equaled \$4,507,654. Personnel expenditures for that period equaled \$3,835,877. Of that amount, \$3,266,476 was for salaries and \$608,491 for fringe benefits. Expenditures for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1997 are projected to equal \$4,755,096, with approximately \$4,000,000 of that amount allocated to personnel expenditures. Salaries and fringe benefits are budgeted at \$3,414,056 and \$626,418, respectively.



Approximately 75 percent of revenues in 1996 was self-generated from sales commissions and court-related fees. The bulk of the remainder (\$933,619) came from security services paid by the City of New Orleans. Expenditures exceeded revenues in 1996 by \$236,935.

The civil sheriff's employees are not members of any civil service system and are not subject to a residency requirement. All deputies involved in security operations and many of the process servers are POST certified. POST-certified deputies are entitled to state supplemental pay.

The adjacent chart sets forth the salary ranges and averages for the employees of the civil sheriff's Uniformed Security Division and Service of Process Department.

Civil Sheriff Salary Ranges and Averages			
	Range		Average
Uniformed Security Division			
Lieutenants	\$22,400	\$26,000	\$24,200
Sergeants	20,800	22,400	21,600
Corporals	16,000	19,800	17,900
Others	12,300	15,400	13,850
Service of Process Dept.	13,500	21,500	17,500

HARBOR POLICE

The Harbor Police operate in and upon the property within the jurisdiction of the Port and the streets and approaches thereto. This territory includes roughly everything on the river side of the levees along the Mississippi River.

The property covered extends from Mississippi River mile marker 115 on the Jefferson Parish /St. Charles Parish border to mile marker 82.1 on the St. Bernard Parish/Plaquemines Parish border. The territory also includes the Inner Harbor Navigational Canal from the Mississippi River to Lake Pontchartrain and the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet to Paris Road. The Harbor Police have responsibility for four bridges owned by the Port: the St. Claude, L & M, Old Seabrook Railroad, and Florida Avenue Bridges.

The Harbor Police view their mission as protecting life and property and ensuring a safe environment in the port area. They have the same power as Louisiana sheriffs to make arrests and to execute and return criminal warrants and processes and all powers of sheriffs as peace officers. Persons arrested and the return of all warrants or processes served are surrendered or delivered to the Criminal Sheriff of Orleans or the Sheriffs of St. Bernard and Jefferson Parishes. The NOPD and the Sheriffs of St. Bernard and Jefferson have concurrent powers to make arrests and to serve warrants and court processes in port territory.

In addition to generally patrolling the waterfront area, the Harbor Police provide, on a no-charge basis, checks on waterfront businesses. They also follow marine movements, recording times of arrival in order to help the Port determine the fees due it. In 1995, the Harbor Police conducted 84,344 business checks and tracked 32,557 marine movements. The Harbor Police keep one boat for emergencies and for limited patrolling to deter illegal shrimping in the Inner Harbor Canal.

Although the Port extends into three parishes, the Harbor Police stations (1 Third Street and 880 Port of New Orleans Place) and most of the port's property are located in New Orleans. The Harbor Police estimate that 90 percent of their time is spent in Orleans. Activities in Jefferson and St. Bernard include a daily property check and response to port-related calls for service.

As of January 22, 1997 the Harbor Police had 81 authorized positions, of which 69 were filled. The filled positions included 52 commissioned officers, ten recruits, five dispatchers and five civilians. Four officers were engaged in support services, such as training, accreditation, crime prevention, internal investigations, and DARE. The other officers, with the exception of the Chief and Deputy Superintendent, were assigned to the patrol division. Five civilians provided administrative services, such as inventory, record keeping, accounting, secretarial, and custodial services. All positions are filled through and subject to the rules and regulations of the State Civil Service Commission.

Total expenditures for the Harbor Police were \$2,839,257 in 1996; expenditures are budgeted at \$3,443,097 in 1997. Total personal service costs for the Harbor Police amounted to \$2,153,003 in 1996 and are projected to equal \$2,557,007 in 1997. Salaries and fringe benefit costs (including uniform allowances) for 1996 amounted to \$1,619,028 and \$535,518, respectively. Salaries and fringe benefits costs (including uniform allowances) for 1997 are estimated at \$1,918,028 and \$638,979, respectively. Harbor police have initiated discussion with the State Civil Service Commission for salary increases.

Harbor Police are not eligible for state supplemental pay. A bill to make them eligible is now pending in the State Legislature.

The chart below sets forth the salary ranges and averages for the various categories of harbor police personnel.

Funds to support the Harbor Police are generated by the activities of the Port of New Orleans through dockage and similar user fees.

Harbor Police Salary Ranges and Averages			
	Range		Average
Recruits and Police Officer I	\$14,736	\$24,600	\$14,804
Police Officer II	15,767	26,322	19,096
Corporal	16,872	26,328	23,312
Sergeant	18,048	28,164	28,129
Lieutenant	19,308	30,132	29,639
Captain	22,104	34,488	34,138
Major	23,652	36,912	37,062
Chief	27,084	42,264	34,828

The Harbor Police operates its own POST training academy, as well as its own firearms training facility. The training academy, located at the main station, is used by other law enforcement agencies, including the Levee Board Police, the local FBI, the St. Bernard Sheriff, the Harahan police, the Tulane University and Louisiana State University police, and the security department of the Medical Center of Louisiana.

The Harbor Police have had for many years an oral agreement with NOPD to handle incidents on the Danziger and Judge Seeber Bridges. Although there are no other intergovernmental agreements, activities are coordinated in a number of areas. As noted earlier, Harbor Police are required by law to turn over to the appropriate sheriff's office arrestees and returned warrants.

Harbor Police use 800 trunking and conventional high band/low band radio systems. They are able to communicate with NOPD over the mutual aid channel and with the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, the Causeway Police, and the State Police. They also have the capability of communicating with other agencies that have 800 trunking and conventional status by adding talk groups. The Harbor Police's computers are linked to NCIC, the Louisiana Law Enforcement Telecommunication System, and NOPD's MOTION System.

LEVEE BOARD POLICE

The Levee Board Police are responsible for maintaining order and exercising general police power on and off the levees within the area of the Orleans Levee District and upon the surrounding waters. They are commissioned as peace officers by the Department of Public Safety and Corrections and have the same power of arrest as peace officers within the area of their jurisdiction.

The Levee Board Police have been designated as special police by NOPD and authorized to deploy officers "in the vicinity of all areas of need in which [they] would otherwise have jurisdiction relating to the functions of the Levee Board." They are also authorized by NOPD to assist NOPD in traffic regulation and to respond to emergency requests for police services in certain areas of the City adjacent to their lakefront levee jurisdiction. They are authorized to handle the initial investigation and reporting of minor thefts, minor burglaries, and other minor offenses. In the case of other crimes, they are to call NOPD for the investigation.

The Orleans levee system includes 129 miles of levee running along Lake Pontchartrain from Jefferson Parish to the Irish Bayou, along the Mississippi River and inland along various canals (including 17th Street, Orleans, and London Avenue Canals). Levee Board Police monitor the levee system and its 108 floodgates on a 24-hour basis. Units are deployed to the following areas: (1) uptown (on an as-needed basis), (2) the Algiers levee system, (3) New Orleans East from the Lakefront to Irish Bayou, (4) the Inner Harbor Canal and (5) the Lower Ninth Ward. Other levee-related duties include escorting sand-bag trucks and making flood control preparations during hurricane season.

Much of the levee board police's time is spent controlling the traffic and crowds along the lakeshore and its parks on weekends. Through scheduling adjustments, the Levee Police sometimes have as many as 30 cars on the lakefront on Sundays. Other services include providing round-the-clock security for the Lakefront Airport and the Orleans and South Shore Harbors, all of which are owned by the Levee Board. The Levee Board Police also

operate a COPS program in the Little Woods area and patrol and answer calls for service in the neighborhoods adjacent to the levee system.

Levee Board Police operate four patrol platoons; a traffic division; and special units which include a maritime division, mounted patrol, and a canine specialist. As of February 3, 1997, the Levee Board Police had 81 authorized positions, of which 76 were filled. Fifty-six of the authorized positions were for sworn officers; five of these were vacant. Five officers were assigned to the administrative office, ten to the COPS program in the Little Woods section of New Orleans East, five to the Lakefront Airport, and the remainder (patrol platoons, traffic division, and the boating unit) to the lakefront office.

Total expenditures for the Levee Board Police in fiscal 1996 were \$2,258,078. Total expenditures for fiscal year 1997 are expected to be \$2,359,675.

Total payroll expenditures for Levee Board Police were \$2,038,689 in 1996. Salaries (including overtime) amounted to \$1,624,830; fringe benefits were \$413,859. The 1997 budget allocates \$1,698,514 for salary and \$389,921 for fringe benefits. Levee Board Police are not eligible for state supplemental pay.

Salaries for the various categories of levee board police personnel are shown on the accompanying chart.

All Levee Board Police employees are classified employees in the state civil service system and participants in the Louisiana State Employees' Retirement System. Employees contribute 7.5 percent of salary; and the Levee Board makes an actuarially determined contribution, which equaled 12 percent in 1996.

Funding for the Levee Board Police, other than for the Little Woods COPS program, is provided out of the levee board's general operating funds. These funds are raised in part by a 12 mill citywide ad valorem tax and related state revenue sharing. The tax and revenue sharing amounted to \$14,804,796 and \$1,583,544, respectively, in 1996.

Levee Board Police receive POST training at NOPD's, the criminal sheriff's, or the harbor police's academy. The training does not include detective work or field training.

The only formal intergovernmental agreement to which the Levee Board is a party is the agreement with NOPD described above. The Levee Board Police also assist NOPD by patrolling for special events. Levee Board Police are participating in the Warrant Task Force. By statute, persons arrested by Levee Board Police are transferred to custody of NOPD.

Approximately 30 percent of levee board police field personnel can communicate with NOPD via radio. Levee Board Police are connected by computer to the NCIC System but not to NOPD's MOTION system.

BRIDGE POLICE

The Crescent City Division of the State Department of Transportation and Development ("Bridge Police") patrol the Crescent City Connection, the Chalmette/Lower Algiers, Canal /Algiers and Gretna /Jackson Avenue ferries and ferry terminals; the approaches to the Crescent City Connection; and the public ways contiguous to the ferries. By statute, their operations on the Pontchartrain Expressway approach to the Crescent City Connection are restricted to the river side of the South Broad Street overpass. Although

Levee Board Police Salary Ranges and Averages			
	RANGE		AVERAGE
Police Officer	\$15,768	\$24,600	\$21,311
Sergeant	18,048	28,164	28,863
Lieutenant	19,308	30,132	31,882
Captain	20,664	32,244	34,518
Major I	22,104	34,488	34,448
Major II	23,652	36,912	36,920
Chief	27,084	42,264	40,789

Note: Average Salary, except for Police Major 1, is based on fiscal year 1997 projections provided by the Levee Board. In the case of eight police officers who were not included in the salary projections, salaries are assumed to be entry-level. In the case Police Major 1, the high-end number is used, since other documents indicate that Major 1 was promoted to Major 2.

the Huey P. Long Bridge is within their jurisdiction, they have arranged for the Causeway Police to handle incidents there. In an emergency situation, the Bridge Police may at the request of these cities and parishes exercise their powers for a limited period of time throughout the geographic limits of such city or parish.

Bridge Police have, in the places under their jurisdiction, the same power to make arrests and to execute and return warrants and processes as sheriffs of Jefferson and St. Bernard Parishes and as police officers of the cities of New Orleans and Gretna. Their basic mission is the facilitation of traffic flow, through traffic safety enforcement and assistance to motorists.

The areas covered by the Bridge Police include parts of Jefferson, St. Bernard, and Orleans Parishes. Most of their activity occurs, however, in Orleans. Based on a survey on police activity prepared by the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development in 1990, almost 80 percent of the police actions involving public safety assistance occurred in Orleans Parish. Ninety-seven percent of the actions involving highway safety enforcement, approximately 60 percent of the calls for service and approximately 50 percent of actions requiring arrests occurred in Orleans.

Bridge Police use roving patrols to cover the six ferry terminals. An officer rides the Canal Street ferry during late hours. At least one officer is stationed at all times at the Toll Plaza. Other officers are deployed along the bridge corridor. Bridge Police provide escort service for delivery of cash from the ferries and toll plazas. They receive and forward NOPD calls for service from the emergency boxes on I-10 and I-610.

As of January 24, 1997, the Bridge Police had 40 authorized law enforcement positions, of which 30 were filled. Supervisory personnel included one chief, two captains, four lieutenants, and five sergeants. The lieutenants serve as watch commanders. Two of them also perform research and planning and internal affairs functions. Four sergeants serve under the watch commanders. A fifth sergeant, the technical services commander, is responsible for training, logistics, and communications.

The Bridge Police have ten vacant positions for Police Officers I and II. They attribute the problem to noncompetitive pay and have received from the State Civil Service Commission permission to increase salaries at these levels. The newly approved salary ranges and the related average salaries for the various law enforcement positions are shown in the accompanying chart.

Bridge Police Salary Ranges and Averages			
	Range		Average
Police Officer I	\$18,864	\$23,520	\$18,864
Police Officer II	20,184	24,600	24,600
Sergeant	18,048	28,164	27,105
Lieutenant	19,308	30,132	27,474
Captain	20,664	32,244	32,244
Chief	25,320	39,504	39,504

Expenditures for the Bridge Police in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1996 totaled \$1,073,641. Personal service expenditures for that period amounted to \$860,739. Expenditures for the first six months of fiscal year 1997 equaled \$480,592, or \$961,180 on an annualized basis. Annual expenditures will increase significantly if Bridge Police are able to fill their vacancies. Filling the ten empty positions at the requested higher salary levels would increase salary expenditures by approximately \$200,000.

Bridge Police are appointed and paid in accordance with state civil service department regulations and participate in the state pension plan. Bridge Police are ineligible for state supplemental pay.

Funding for the Bridge Police is obtained from toll collections and Highway Trust Fund No. 2.

Bridge Police cooperate and coordinate with other agencies in a numbers of ways. In addition to sharing jurisdiction with NOPD on the New Orleans portion of the Crescent City Connection, the Crescent City Police, when requested by NOPD, handle accident-related

calls for service in the Fourth District. They also participate in the regional task force for drug interdiction. Bridge Police receive their training at the Harbor Police Academy.

Bridge Police operate on an 800 trunking system and a 450 trunking system. They have no direct contact with other law enforcement agencies and must communicate with them through their dispatcher.

STATE POLICE

Orleans Parish falls within the territory of Troop B of the State Police. Day-to-day activities of the State Police in Orleans Parish involve narcotics investigations and the regulation and enforcement of all aspects of gaming (including horse-racing, video poker and land-based and riverboat casinos).

In addition, the State Police routinely provide major support to NOPD for the Sugarbowl, the Superbowl, and Mardi Gras. The State Police sent more than 80 police to New Orleans for several days for the Sugar Bowl and for a seven-day period at the time of the Super Bowl. On Super Bowl Sunday itself, a total of 130 troopers were assigned to New Orleans. The State Police also provided approximately 100 troopers to New Orleans for a six-day period at Mardi Gras. In the case of these special troop deployments, the City arranges and pays for lodging for the troops; the State Police pay for personnel costs.

One of the most interesting aspects of the state police's role in New Orleans is what they don't do: handle traffic accidents and investigations and respond to calls for service from the call boxes on the state and interstate highways. State Police handle such matters in most other parishes but say that they have traditionally not been welcome in Orleans Parish.

The welcome mat is now out. Chief Pennington has asked the State Police to take over patrol of the interstate system, a request that has been declined. State Police have indicated that although they have no problem in principle with assuming the duty, they would need another 10 to 12 troopers to assume the new duties. At the present time, the State Police are at only 60 percent of their manpower needs for existing duties.

APPENDIX B: DESCRIPTION OF SECONDARY AGENCIES

At least eight city departments and state authorities and commissions operate security forces with varying degrees of law enforcement powers. The Orleans Parish School Board employs over 100 security counselors. Medical Center of Louisiana employs over 50 officers. HANO, the Municipal Building Security Department and the Superdome have between 25 and 50 security officers. The City Park Commission, Audubon Institute, and the French Market Corporation all hire smaller numbers of security officers. In some cases the security personnel are indistinguishable from the armed security guards operating in the private arena. In other cases, they are sworn officers authorized to exercise police powers within limited areas.

The following is a summary of the duties, manpower, and budgets of the larger departments, as well as a brief description of how they interface with other law enforcement agencies.

ORLEANS PARISH SCHOOL BOARD

The Orleans Parish School Board operates a Department of Security and Campus Relations ("Security Department"), which is responsible for maintaining a safe and secure environment in the public schools. The Security Department employs 108 security officers, known as Security Counselors. Seventy of these are assigned to individual middle and high schools during school hours ("Site-based Counselors"). Thirty-eight others operate in the patrol division on an around-the-clock-basis, performing property checks, responding to burglar alarms, and coming to the assistance of Site-based Counselors when needed.

Security Counselors have authority to detain people and make arrests on and within a two-block radius of the School Board's 152 campuses. Beyond that area the Security Counselors can only monitor activity. All of the Security Counselors are uniformed and have limited commissions. Patrol officers are armed.

Site-based Counselors are hired for nine months of the year. Many find additional work during the summer in the summer school program or in federally funded school programs. Patrol personnel are hired on a year-round basis.

The Security Counselors do not participate in any civil service system. Applicants are hired only if they have had lengthy service in the security sector or in law enforcement. Many are former NOPD officers or deputies.

The estimated budget for the Security Department in the 1995-96 school year was \$1,477,014. The proposed budget for 1996-97 school year is \$1,506,835. Of these amounts, \$1,082,457 and \$1,123,909, respectively, are for salaries and benefits of patrol officers and supervisory personnel. The budgets do not include the salaries and budgets of Site-based Counselors (approximately two-thirds of the security force), who are paid out of the budgets of the schools at which they are employed. Salaries range from \$15,138 to \$19,141 for a 12-month position and \$12,090 to \$15,288 for a 9-month position.

NOPD and the school system's Security Department frequently interface. NOPD has in the district stations seven school resource officers who act as a liaison between NOPD and the Security Department during school hours. The Security Department works with transit police to deal with student crimes and activities at bus stops and on public transportation.

The security department's interface with NOPD's truancy program is limited to the stationing of one Security Counselor at the Truancy Center and to transporting home students whose parents or guardians could not be located during the day. The Security Department does not participate in the Warrant Task Force or otherwise actively participate in locating

students for whom warrants have been issued. Their role is limited to contacting school principals to call wanted students out of class when NOPD is planning to take such students into custody at school.

The Security Department operates a data base for tracking incidents on a daily basis. It does not have access to any other crime-related data bases. The Director indicated that it would be very useful to have access to such data bases for ID and motor vehicle checks.

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF NEW ORLEANS

The security department of the Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO) operates at the main office and around the clock at HANO's three residences for the elderly. The officers patrol the premises, check IDs, and respond to problems. The only function they presently perform at the other residences is the removal of vandalized or abandoned vehicles. HANO officers have the power to detain people who break the law on HANO property, but NOPD police make the actual arrests.

As of December 17, 1996, HANO had 31 employees in its security department, including 25 patrol officers. The department has received authorization to increase its size to 53 by hiring 22 new patrol officers. Once the force is expanded the security department plans to assume responsibility for responding on HANO property to noise and similar non-threatening complaints that consume police time.

Security department personnel are members of the state civil service. The security department has received authorization to upgrade the various positions.

The only requirements for being a security guard are that the candidate be 21 years old and have no police record. Security personnel receive minimal training.

HANO's security department is funded from the authority's operating funds. Expenditures for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1996, were \$643,670 and the proposed budget for fiscal year 1997 is \$526,460.

NOPD through the COPS program provides law enforcement services at six HANO sites. In addition, five police officers oversee on HANO property various intervention programs, including DARE, Explorers, Neighborhood Watch, and Stop the Violence. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms operates Operation Safe Home, a federally funded drug enforcement program.

HANO's radio system is not compatible with that of NOPD. Security officers must communicate with NOPD by making telephone calls to 911. The department has no direct access to any law enforcement data bases.

MUNICIPAL BUILDING SECURITY DIVISION

The Municipal Building Security Division (MBSD) was formed under the Department of Property Management in the 1980s and transferred to NOPD in 1987. In 1995 it was moved back to the Department of Property Management. The MBSD has four divisions: court liaison, council security, grounds patrol, and city attorney's office.

The original mandate of the MBSD was to standardize security procedures and standards at all municipal properties. Due to a shortage of personnel, however, the grounds patrol covers only seven pieces of property: City Hall, the City Hall Annex, Traffic and Municipal Court, the city's Equipment Maintenance Division, the Visitors Center in New Orleans East, the Central New Orleans Public Library, and Armstrong Park.

Forty-six people currently work for MBSD. Of the 40 ground patrol officers, 23 are commissioned deputies who work under a contract between the Department of Property Management and the Civil Sheriff's Office. The other MBSD personnel include five police officers and one civilian seconded from NOPD. Of the five commissioned police officers, one acts as the commander and two function as platoon commanders. Another serves summonses and subpoenas and closes down tax-evading businesses for the City Attorney's Office. The fifth is assigned to the City Council to help council members verify and investigate complaints from constituents.

The MBSD has received a request to provide security services for the Criminal Court. No decision has been made on the matter. The MBSD's commander indicated that he would need four additional patrol officers to perform that function.

MBSD grounds patrol officers have been trained to contain incidents and evaluate situations. They have the power to detain suspects but not to make arrests. Arrests are made by one of the NOPD officers assigned to MBSD or by district officers. Members of the MBSD carry police radios, and the office's computers are linked to the NOPD data bases.

The Department of Property Management has installed video equipment in certain city locations. It is in the process of installing a computerized verification system for tours of duty.

MBSD expended \$1,030,764 in 1996 and has budgeted \$1,432,828 for 1997. MBSD employees are poorly paid. The average pay for a ground patrol officer is \$6 an hour. A proposal to modify the compensation structure to reward longevity of service is pending.

SUPERDOME SECURITY

Security for the Superdome is provided by the private management company that operates it, Facility Management of Louisiana. The company employs 28 security officers on a full-time basis and 14 reserve officers on a part-time basis. The officers have limited commissions from NOPD for superdome property. All are armed.

Security personnel receive basic training and firearms training through a local private training company. Training consists of four days of classroom instruction and two days of firearms training. Additional training is provided in self-defense and physical arrest techniques. Internal training is provided on an annual basis.

The staff is supplemented for special events by non-commissioned security personnel and by NOPD officers hired on detail. Supplemental staff can range from two people for a small event to a couple of hundred security guards and 60 policemen for grounds control for professional football games. Additional police are hired for traffic control. A command post, with representatives of security, police, and paramedics, is established for major events.

Security operations at the Superdome are funded by Facility Management of Louisiana. Full-time commissioned security officers are compensated at a salary range of between \$13,000 and \$14,000 annually, depending on experience and tenure.

MEDICAL CENTER OF LOUISIANA

Medical Center of Louisiana ("Medical Center"), which was formed by a consolidation of University Hospital West and Charity Hospital, employs 99 security officers. Sixty-four are assigned to the former Charity Hospital complex; the remaining 35 are assigned to the former University Hospital.

The security department is responsible for the safety and security of the patients, visitors, and more than 5,000 employees of the Medical Center. It provides internal and external patrol for twenty buildings along Canal Street, including hospitals and parking, maintenance, and warehouse facilities.

The security situation of the Medical Center is more complex than that of other medical facilities because inmates from all over the state are brought to the center for both in-patient and out-patient medical treatment. Both the Criminal Sheriff and the Louisiana Department of Corrections have personnel assigned to the hospital areas that house prisoners.

The minimum training requirements for medical center security personnel are six days of basic training and two days of firearms training from a private security company. Approximately 75 percent are POST-certified. Medical center personnel are members of the state classified civil service.

Medical center security personnel receive about 1800 to 1900 calls for service a month. The incidents range from domestic fights to inmate escapes.

Arrests in the hospital complex are written up by NOPD, which also provides transport of arrestees. Communications with NOPD are by telephone with the precinct commanders or the Downtown Development District substation. The Medical Center participates in the New Orleans Medical Complex Police/Security Task Force, a group of hospital security forces which work collectively to solve their common problems and to coordinate their security activities in the medical corridor.

APPENDIX C: POLICE FORCE CONSOLIDATION IN OTHER CITIES

How does the number of law enforcement authorities in New Orleans compare with that in other cities, and how have other cities dealt with a multiplicity of forces within their boundaries? What can New Orleans learn from their experience?

COMPARISON WITH OTHER CITIES

Number of agencies

Because the City of New Orleans and Orleans Parish share the same boundaries, New Orleans' law enforcement structure is actually less fragmented than that of parishes or counties with large numbers of municipalities inside their boundaries. Jefferson Parish, for example, has five separate municipal police departments in addition to its sheriff. (It does, however, have just one sheriff's office that handles both civil and criminal matters.)

The other cities contacted by BGR all indicated that a number of law enforcement agencies other than municipal police operate in their boundaries. Where city and county are coterminous, there may be a sheriff. Typically, the additional law enforcement agencies in cities and city-counties are associated with special district governments or public institutions, such as airport authorities, school boards, housing authorities, transit authorities, parks, universities, stadiums, and hospitals. New Orleans does have three water-related police forces that are not typical for cities—the Bridge, Harbor, and Levee Board Police.

When one considers that New Orleans is also Orleans Parish with all the functions typical of a highly urbanized county, the number of law enforcement authorities is not out of line for a city or urbanized county of its size. Moreover, the amount of functional overlap is much less than the number of agencies might suggest.

Duties of Sheriffs

While it is unusual for a city or county to have two sheriffs, it is not unusual to find variations in the scope of sheriffs' authority. Most sheriff's offices operate on a "full service" basis, providing law enforcement services to the unincorporated parts of counties, performing judicial services (such as the provision of courtroom security and service of papers) and operating the jail system. There are, however, three alternatives to the full-service model: the law enforcement model, with the sheriff performing law enforcement duties only; the civil-judicial model, with the sheriff providing court services only; and the correctional-judicial model, with the sheriff operating the jail and servicing the needs of the court.

The Orleans Parish sheriffs' offices operate on the correctional/judicial model, with the sheriffs providing judicial and corrections services and the police department providing law enforcement services. In that respect Orleans Parish is similar to San Francisco, another city with matching city/county boundaries. New Orleans goes beyond San Francisco in terms of fragmentation, however, in that the judicial component in New Orleans is divided between two sheriffs.

CONSOLIDATION EXPERIENCE OF OTHER CITIES

City/County Mergers

The complete merger of police departments has usually occurred in connection with the general consolidation of city/county governments. Nashville/Davidson County,

Jacksonville/Duval County, Lexington/Fayette County, Indianapolis/Marion County and, more recently, Athens/Clarke County, Georgia, are examples of this type of merger. Scores of other proposals for city/county consolidations have failed at the polls.

City Police into County Sheriff Mergers

A follow-up study of the 1968 merger of the Jacksonville police into the Duval County sheriff's office reviewed expectations against results five years after the merger. The study noted that the merger was expected to create an agency capable of providing optimal law enforcement in the most efficient and economic way. It was not expected to result in a cutback of expenditures.

The study indicated that five years after the merger, citizens were receiving more "service" for tax dollars, in the form of increased apprehensions, arrests, and citations. The improved service had, however, carried a price tag. The cost of police services rose from \$8.6 million in 1968-69 to nearly \$14 million in 1971-72. Substantial investment had been required to pay for past capital neglect, increased recruitment, salary equalization, and equipment purchases. Economies of scale, which had been expected in the areas of motor pool, data processing, communications, personnel, and purchasing, had materialized only in the motor pool.

Cost Increases Common

Cost increases appear to be a common theme in consolidations. The merger of Nashville into Davidson County also resulted in increased costs of law enforcement, with the majority of residents expressing the view that services remained the same. The Athens/Clarke County merger in 1990 also caused cost increases, largely as a result of charter provisions requiring pay equalization, limiting layoffs, and requiring equivalent positions in the new organization for transferred employees.

Partial Consolidations

Two recent studies addressing the possible consolidation of city/county police services have recommended lesser measures. In the case of Tuscaloosa County, The Public Affairs Research Council of Alabama concluded that while further city/county consolidation would be beneficial, such consolidation should proceed through the step-by-step integration of specific services, rather than through a general merger of governments. The recommendation called for, among other things, the development of plans for county-wide water, sewer and fire protection. It omitted law enforcement services from its recommendations.

The Atlanta study analyzing the feasibility and desirability of consolidating fire services and police services of Atlanta and Fulton County also stopped short of recommending a complete consolidation of such services. It suggested that in the case of the police, the most realistic approach would be merger of select activities. Activities recommended for consideration included procurement, training, maintenance and repair, records, and identification. Communications were omitted because none of the groups indicated a willingness to give up control of that function.

The Atlanta study also recommended establishing an umbrella administrative planning committee to oversee fire and police services in Atlanta, Fulton County and the nine other municipalities located in the county. The purpose of the committee would be to consider those services and activities that could best be accommodated by sharing, merging, or consolidating some or all of the governments. The study recommended beginning with fire services, since officials in both governments seemed much less open to consolidation of police services.

Elsewhere in Louisiana

Proponents of a city/parish merger in Lafayette tried in 1980 to craft a merger proposal which would have included the law enforcement services in both the City and Parish of Lafayette. They were foiled by difficulties arising from the interplay of Article V, Section 27, and Article X, Section 16, of the Louisiana Constitution. Article V, Section 27, designates the sheriff as the chief law enforcement officer of the parish. Article X, Section 16 provides for the establishment of classified fire and police civil service systems in municipalities with populations exceeding 13,000. Because the office of sheriff was constitutionally protected, the merger had to be structured as a merger of the police into the sheriff. The police were willing to accept such a merger if they could retain civil service protection. The sheriff refused to allow a civil-service limitation of his prerogatives, creating a hurdle which was never surmounted.

SPECIAL PURPOSE POLICE DEPARTMENTS

Proposals have been made in recent years to consolidate specialized police departments. In 1995 New York City implemented one such proposal by consolidating its three major police departments. The consolidation, which took the form of a merger of the Housing Police and Transit Police Departments into the New York Police Department, was undertaken to provide better police services to public housing residents and to users of public transportation. Expected benefits included more effective use of police strategies, greater accountability through a single chain of command, the streamlining of administrative and support units to allow for the redeployment of police officers to field functions, and the elimination of duplicate responses.

The consolidation involved the transfer of more than 7,000 employees and the reassignment of 550 police officers from administrative and support functions to field duty. Fifty-four former transit police department and 16 former housing police department administrative and support units were merged into their New York police department counterparts. Former transit and housing patrol units were placed under newly-created transit and housing bureaus.

A task force formed to study the Boston Municipal [Buildings] Police Department (BMPD) recently recommended integration of that department and possibly the Boston Housing Authority Police into the Boston Police Department. The BMPD, which was originally formed to protect city-owned buildings, parks, and facilities had expanded its activities to include police services in public housing developments in Boston. As a result, three different police forces were providing police services to public housing developments. The study recommended that BMPD be restricted to providing security in city-owned buildings and that its law enforcement duties with respect to public housing be turned over to the Boston Police Department. The task force also recommended a study to determine whether qualified officers of the Boston Housing Authority Police should be incorporated into the Boston Police Department.

A consolidation of law enforcement agencies occurred at the state level in Massachusetts in 1991. The Registry of Motor Vehicle Police, Capitol Police, and Metropolitan Police Department were merged into the State Police in order to improve crime-fighting strategies by centralizing limited resources and fostering enhanced coordination. Consolidation of the Massachusetts State Police and the Massachusetts Transit Authority Police is also under consideration.

A number of mergers of specialized police forces are being studied on the West Coast. San Francisco is considering a merger of the San Francisco Airport Police into the San Francisco Police Department as a method of enhancing airport security. Los Angeles is evaluating the feasibility of a merger between the Los Angeles Police Department and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority of Los Angeles in order to eliminate duplication of service, improve coordination, and enhance the morale and status of the transit police.

APPENDIX D: IMPACT ON PERSONNEL COSTS OF CONSOLIDATION INTO NOPD

IMPACT ON SALARIES

The following charts provide a very rough idea of the impact of consolidation on the salary cost components. Information on benefit costs and state supplemental salary are treated in separate sections.

The following notes apply to all the charts:

1. Except as noted elsewhere, the NOPD Differential is the Average Salary minus the minimum pay for the NOPD equivalent rank. Average salaries for the rank of police officers have been compared to NOPD Police Officer IV, the rank that is normally achieved after five years of service. Average salaries have been calculated based on lists of the individual salaries provided by the agencies.
2. Salaries do not include overtime, state supplemental pay, uniform allowances, or, in the case of NOPD, longevity pay. Fringe benefits are treated in the next section.
3. NOPD has indicated that in a consolidation it would not need additional police officers above the rank of sergeant. Therefore, officers above that rank have been eliminated in the consolidation calculations.

Harbor Police					
Title	No.	Average Salary	NOPD Differential	Total Differential	Eliminated Positions
Recruit	10	\$14,804	\$7,696	\$76,960	
Police Officer I		\$14,804	\$9,640		
Police Officer II	27	\$19,096	\$10,124	\$273,348	
Corporal	12	\$23,312	\$5,908	\$70,896	
Sergeant	5	\$28,129	\$5,363	\$26,815	
Lieutenant	4	\$29,639			\$118,556
Captain	2	\$34,138			\$68,276
Major	1	\$37,062			\$37,062
Chief	1	\$34,828			\$34,827
Dispatchers & Clerical					\$125,029
TOTAL				\$448,019	\$383,750

Note: The differential for Corporal has been calculated by using the minimum for NOPD Police Officer IV.

Bridge Police					
Title	No.	Average Salary	NOPD Differential	Total Differential	Eliminated Position
Police Officer I (Recruit)	1	\$18,864	\$3,636	\$3,636	
Police Officer II	17	\$24,600	\$4,620	\$78,540	
Sergeant	5	\$27,105	\$6,387	\$31,935	
Lieutenant	4	\$27,474			\$109,896
Captain	2	\$32,244			\$64,488
Chief	1	\$39,504			\$39,504
TOTAL				\$114,111	\$213,888

Levee Board Police					
Title	No.	Average Salary	NOPD Differential	Total Differential	Eliminated Position
Police Officer	44	\$21,311	\$7,909	\$347,966	
Sergeant	6	\$28,863	\$4,629	\$27,774	
Lieutenant*	6	\$31,882	(\$2,662)	(\$15,972)	
Captain*	5	\$34,518	(\$5,298)	(\$26,490)	
Major 1	1				\$34,448
Major 2	1				\$36,920
Chief	1				\$40,789
Civilian					\$100,000
TOTAL				\$333,278	\$212,157

Note:

* Levee Board Police have indicated that Lieutenants and Captains spend only about one-quarter and one-half an hour, respectively, on desk work each day. The rest of their time is spent on active police work. We have included the lieutenants and captains in the transferred category, on the theory that they are performing patrol-type services that would have to be replicated in order to maintain the same level of service. Their salaries were compared to Police Officer IV. Salaries for boating personnel are approximately \$80,500. They have not been eliminated in this calculation, since NOPD has no boating capacity.

IMPACT ON FRINGE BENEFITS

The following are very rough estimates of the impact that consolidation into NOPD would have on benefit costs:

Harbor Police	Decrease of \$ 9,500
Bridge Police	Increase of \$ 32,000
Levee Board Police	Increase of \$ 172,500

The estimate for each agency was made by calculating the Benefit Differential on projected post-transfer salaries of transferred employees and deducting from such amount the benefit savings attributable to termination of other employees. The Benefit Differential was determined by adding (i) the product of the Total Differential and the NOPD Ratio and (ii) the product of the Total Transferred Salary Base and the Benefit Ratio Change. Total Transferred Salary Base equals the total salaries now paid by the applicable agency to transferred employees. The Benefit Ratio Change, which is the difference between the

NOPD Ratio and the applicable agency ratio, is estimated at 8 percent for the Levee Board and Bridge Police and at negative 2 percent for the Harbor Police.

Based on the limited information available, BGR has estimated the total fringe benefit expenses for NOPD Police Officers at approximately 31 percent of total salary expenses for such officers (the "NOPD Ratio"). The ratios of fringe benefits to salary are 33 percent in the case of Harbor Police and 23 percent in the case of Levee Board Police. In the absence of detailed information on this point from the Bridge Police (other than that its benefits are less than those of the other groups), BGR has approximated the Bridge Police's ratio at the lower Levee Board Police rate.

IMPACT ON STATE SUPPLEMENTAL PAY

Once transferred personnel became commissioned officers with more than one year of service, they would become entitled to state supplemental pay of \$278 per month or \$3,336 per year. Increases in costs related to supplemental pay for transferred personnel are estimated as follows:

Harbor Police	Increase of \$ 180,000
Bridge Police	Increase of \$ 76,700
Levee Board Police	Increase of \$ 204,000

APPENDIX E: IMPACT ON PERSONNEL COSTS OF A HARBOR/LEEVE BOARD POLICE CONSOLIDATION

The following chart provides a rough idea of the impact on salary of a consolidation of Levee Board Police and Harbor Police.

Harbor/Levee Board						
Title	Levee Board		Harbor		Total Differential	Eliminated Positions
	No.	Average Salary	No.	Average Salary		
Recruits			10	\$14,804		
Police Officer	44	\$21,311	27	\$19,096	\$59,805	
Corporal			12	\$23,312	(\$24,012)	
Sergeant	6	\$28,863	5	\$28,129	\$3,670	
Lieutenant	5	\$31,882	4	\$29,639		\$118,556
Captain	5	\$34,338	2	\$34,138		\$68,276
Major	2	\$35,684	1	\$37,062		\$37,062
Chief	1	\$40,789	1	\$34,828		\$34,828
TOTAL					\$39,463	\$258,722

Notes:

1. Salaries do not include overtime.
2. Differential equals, for each rank, the difference between the Average Salaries paid by the two groups. For purposes of that calculation, Harbor Police Corporals are treated as Levee Board Police Officers.
3. For purposes of this analysis, BGR has assumed the elimination of the Harbor Police command structure above the rank of sergeant. The chart thus reflects as retained costs the higher salaries of Levee Board Police and the higher number of ranking officers in that organization.

LIST OF INTERVIEWS

City of New Orleans, Department of Police: Superintendent Richard Pennington, January 17, 1996

City of New Orleans, Department of Property Management, Municipal Building Security Division: Sergeant Carl Perilloux (Commander), December 18, 1996

Housing Authority of New Orleans: Mr. Alfred Lee, Jr. (Director of HANO Security), December 17, 1996

Linder/Maple Group, Messrs. John Linder and Jack Maple, September 20, 1996

Louisiana Department of Transportation & Development, Crescent City Connection Division: Mr. Alan J. LeVasseur (Executive Director), Michael Helmstetter (Chief of Police) and Randall M. Paisant (Assistant Executive Director), October 14, 1996 and January 14, 1997

Louisiana State Police: Colonel W.R. Whittington (Superintendent), Captain L.M. Ryan (Troop B. Commander) and Captain Ronald B. Jones (Operational Development, Public Affairs), February 6, 1997

Louisiana Superdome: Facility Management of Louisiana, Mr. Roger Kelly (Director of Security), February 18, 1997

Medical Center of Louisiana, Police Department: Mr. Michael Hamilton (Director), January 7, 1997

New Orleans Police Foundation: Mr. Terry Ebbert (Executive Director), September 20, 1996

Orleans Levee District Police Department: Superintendent Richard J. Lewis, Deputy Superintendent Emery P. Spiers, Mr. Gary Benoit, Major Rodriguez, Sgt. Polk, September 27, 1996 and January 17, 1997

Orleans Parish Civil Sheriff's Office: Sheriff Paul R. Valteau, Jr., January 21, 1997

Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff's Office: Sheriff Charles C. Foti, Jr., January 24, 1997

Orleans Parish School Board: Mr. Maxie Gagnard (Director of Security and Campus Relations), December 16, 1996

Port of New Orleans Harbor Police: Superintendent Robert Hecker, Major Malcolm McGhee (Support), Captain Randall (Patrol), January 14, 1997

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